Analysis of the Challenges of Differentiating Criminal Procedure
The differentiation of criminal procedure, as one of the most profound conceptual and structural developments in contemporary criminal policy, concerns the deliberate transition from a uniform and rigid model of adjudication toward a flexible, purposive system based on the diversification of criminal justice responses. This approach, which has emerged with the claim of enhancing the efficiency of the criminal justice system and guaranteeing fair trial, possesses considerable theoretical and practical capacities; nevertheless, it faces fundamental and multidimensional challenges that simultaneously affect its normative legitimacy and institutional effectiveness. At the theoretical level, ambiguity in the concept and scope of differentiation, the absence of transparent, rational, and controllable criteria for distinguishing between types of proceedings, and its potential conflict with fundamental principles such as equality before the law, legality of procedure, legal security, and predictability of rules cast serious doubt on the philosophical and legal foundations of this approach. At the practical level, the concentration and broad flexibility of the powers of prosecutorial authorities, the discretionary application of differentiated regulations, weak effective judicial oversight, the absence of uniform judicial practice, and institutional inconsistency—and, at the jurisprudential level, ambiguity regarding the manner of applying Qur’anic verses, hadiths, and rules related to justice—challenge the coherent and fair implementation of procedural differentiation. Using an analytical-critical method and a comparative approach, the present article systematically examines the most important theoretical, practical, and jurisprudential challenges of differentiating criminal procedure across all stages of the criminal process. It emphasizes the necessity of reconsidering the theoretical foundations, formulating transparent and binding criteria, strengthening judicial oversight, and effectively guaranteeing individuals’ fundamental rights as prerequisites for the realization of legitimate, coherent, and sustainable criminal justice.