An American lead in artificial intelligence may be a strategic objective. It cannot also be the condition under which an international safety regime remains intelligible. This paper distinguishes three arrangements often conflated in the debate: commitments explicitly conditioned on a developer’s lead, domestic oversig...
Ana (李安娜) Li· Zenodo (CERN European Organi...· 0 citations
An American lead in artificial intelligence may be a strategic objective. It cannot also be the condition under which an international safety regime remains intelligible. This paper distinguishes three arrangements often conflated in the debate: commitments explicitly conditioned on a developer’s lead, domestic oversig...
Ana (李安娜) Li· Zenodo (CERN European Organi...· 0 citations
An American lead in artificial intelligence may be a strategic objective. It cannot also be the condition under which an international safety regime remains intelligible. This paper distinguishes three arrangements often conflated in the debate: commitments explicitly conditioned on a developer’s lead, domestic oversig...
Ana (李安娜) Li· Zenodo (CERN European Organi...· 0 citations
An American lead in artificial intelligence may be a strategic objective. It cannot also be the condition under which an international safety regime remains intelligible. This paper distinguishes three arrangements often conflated in the debate: commitments explicitly conditioned on a developer’s lead, domestic oversig...
Ana (李安娜) Li· Zenodo (CERN European Organi...· 0 citations
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