We give new mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the offline, secretary, and prophet-with-samples models. Specifically, we obtain the following guarantees for social welfare maximization with $m$ items and $n$ XOS buyers: * In the prophet-with-samples version, buyers arrive in adversarial order and draw their value...
We study the query complexity of finding a Tarski fixed point over $[n]^k$. Previous work has left a large gap between $\smash{{\Omega}(\log^2 n)}$ and $\smash{\log^{O(k)}n}$. We show that both of the previous upper and lower bounds were far from tight: for every $k\geq 3$, \[ \Omega\left((\log n)^{\frac{1}{2}\lceil \l...
Xi Chen, Rui-Quan Gao, Yu-Hao Li et al.· 0 citations
A central challenge in mechanism design is to develop truthful trade mechanisms that maximize the expected gains-from-trade (GFT) in two-sided markets. Because achieving the full GFT is generally impossible, the literature has focused on constant-factor approximations---a notoriously difficult problem even in simple se...