The security of the certifiable randomness protocol of Yamakawa-Zhandry unconditionally is proved, without relying on the unproven Aaronson-Ambainis conjecture, against low query-depth quantum adversaries: specifically, adversaries that make up to o(\log \lambda) adaptive quantum queries to the random oracle.
It is shown that any prover-efficient classical interactive protocol for the BQP must rely on non-relativizing techniques, which might serve as a partial explanation for the lack of progress towards doubly-efficient, unconditionally sound classical verification of quantum computation.
Adam Bouland, Andrew Huang, Anand Natarajan et al.· arXiv.org· 1 citation· ⚡1
A certified randomness protocol in the quantum random oracle model is obtained that proves unconditional security of this protocol against adversaries making subexponentially-many adaptive quantum queries to the random oracle.
A. Coladangelo, Dakshita Khurana, Saachi Mutreja et al.· 0 citations
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