Author

Biaoshuai Tao

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Preprint Sep 2026

Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share Guarantee

We study the truthful and fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ strategic agents with additive valuations. Babaioff, Feige, and Manaker Morag [FOCS 2026] gave a randomized mechanism that uses only the agents'rankings of the goods, is truthful in expectation (TIE), and guarantees every agent $1/(H_{n-1}+2)=\Theta(...

Meng-Fan Ma, Biaoshuai Tao, Fang-Xiao Wang · 0 citations

Preprint Sep 2026

Comparison-Based Fair Division of Indivisible Chores

We investigate the query complexity of fairly allocating $m$ indivisible chores among $n$ agents with additive cost functions. We depart from the standard cardinal model and assume only comparison access: an algorithm may ask an agent which of two bundles is less costly, but never observes numerical costs. Our first re...

Ze-Han Lin, Shengxin Liu, Biaoshuai Tao et al. · 0 citations

Preprint Aug 2026

Bayesian Fair Division: Truthfulness in Picking Sequence with Correlated Valuations

Sequential allocation mechanisms contain a class of widely studied mechanisms (e.g., round-robin) in the fair division of indivisible goods, where agents take turns picking items in a predefined picking order. It is known that the sequential allocation mechanisms are not truthful: when an agent's most preferred item is...

Xiao-Lin Bu, Biaoshuai Tao · 0 citations