Deciding which of two agents is stronger means playing games until skill outweighs luck, and every game costs money, model inference, or expert time. Since the number of games needed is unknown, fixed-budget evaluations either keep paying after the result is settled or stop before the agents can be told apart, while na...
The Independent Chip Model (ICM) converts tournament chips into reference prize equity, and policies are routinely constructed against those values. Because ICM reads only stack sizes, it omits action order, blind obligations, and seat rotation, and it does not price the elimination pressure a big stack puts on the sho...
The Abstraction Agent is proposed, a zero-shot pipeline that uses a large language model (LLM) to discover continuous strategic features from a natural-language game description, score private states on these features, and cluster them into abstraction buckets, without any game-specific evaluator, training data, or gam...
An agent playing a Nash-equilibrium strategy in a two-player zero-sum imperfect-information game secures the game value but forfeits the additional value offered by a flawed opponent. Diffuse deviations pose a particular challenge: binary release rules may gather too little evidence to act, while a full best response t...
Mixed-Strategy Decision Tree (MDT) is proposed, which articulates the silent optimality of the equilibrium into sparse strategic rules that both humans and LLMs could understand and extends the input to arbitrarily new states and continuations.
Hanxiao Wang, Philippe Beardsell, Boning Li et al.· 2 citations
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