A coding agent edits files and executes shell commands with its developer's privileges, allowing malicious requests to translate directly into harmful actions or functional malware. Existing defenses have complementary limitations: weight-level alignment is unavailable to API-only deployers, whereas input filters and execution-boundary monitors require auxiliary classification or checking components along the agent's trajectory. We therefore introduce SkillShield, a system-prompt defense that synthesizes security skills offline from known attacks or recorded agent failures. These skills are injected into the system prompt at session start and remain active throughout the tool-use loop. Unlike a reference monitor, they protect the system by defining the security policies the model should follow during execution. Due to the limited system-prompt space, we examine three fixed-budget provisioning scopes: all-classes, with one skill covering all threat classes, per-bundle, with one skill targeting a related subset, and per-class, with one skill dedicated to a single known class and used as the upper-bound reference. None requires runtime request classification or routing. Across six large language models on RedCode, the default all-classes skill reduces malware-generation severity from 3.37 to 0.58 and achieves a 43.6% execution attack success rate, comparable to Llama Guard 3's 42.7% without its separate 8B classifier. The per-bundle and class-fixed per-class settings further reduce this rate to 36.2% and 14.5%, respectively. Under two non-adaptive jailbreak families, SkillShield continues to outperform all baselines on malware generation. Across 731 benign task descriptions, SkillShield yields a mean safety-refusal rate of 0.14%. These results demonstrate the potential of prompt-space security skills to prevent harmful actions and malware generation for LLM coding agents.
Xiaodong Wu, Zhimin Zhao, Qi Li et al.· 0 citations
Long-horizon coding agents accumulate hundreds of actions and observations in their trajectories, yet nothing in this record indicates which observations still describe the repository as it currently stands. Before every decision, the model must implicitly infer the execution status from raw history, and when this inference falls short, the agent acts on outdated file contents or re-executes work whose results are still valid. We propose Ledger, a deterministic runtime layer that distills an agent's completed interactions into an explicit execution state: what has been observed, what has been modified, and what has been attempted. Ledger keeps this state in an online execution ledger and applies it at two boundaries of every step. Before the model acts, an inform path appends a compact runtime state view to the prompt; before a proposed command runs, a govern path checks it against the ledger, returning still-valid earlier results in place of re-execution and flagging likely-redundant repetition. The layer adds no language-model calls and wraps an otherwise unmodified agent. Across all 500 SWE-bench Verified instances, Ledger raises Pass@1 from 56.2% to 64.2% with GPT-5 mini and from 75.8% to 81.0% with MiniMax M2.5, while cutting total cost by 28.9% and 31.8%. Attached to OpenAI Codex, it adds 3.4 percentage points of Pass@1 at 24.4% lower cost. Ablations attribute most of the resolution gain to govern and most of the efficiency gain to inform, with their combination performing best. What long-horizon agents lack, we conclude, is not a shorter view of their history but an explicit account of their own execution state.
Zehao Wang, Yisen Xu, Chenglin Li et al.· 2 citations
The first controlled longitudinal study that isolates the scaffolding’s contribution to agent quality over time is conducted, revealing that despite continuous development activity and growing codebase complexity of the scaffoldings, there is no statistically significant improvement in SWE-bench benchmark score across releases for a given fixed LLM version.
This paper empirically study the development and release evolution of five major open-source agent harnesses, revealing extreme release velocities exceeding two releases per day and thousands of issues within months, and performs the first controlled longitudinal study that isolates the agent harness contribution.
O. Sghaier, Hao Li, Bram Adams et al.· 2 citations