Learned optimization aims to improve upon hand-designed optimizers (e.g., Adam and Muon) by meta-learning small neural network optimizers over a distribution of tasks. While recent work has greatly advanced the architectural design and inductive biases of learned optimizers (LOs), their meta-training remains biased toward short-unroll learning on particular tasks, resulting in redundant computation and leaving LOs often unable to compete with hand-designed optimizers. We introduce Efficient Long-hOrizon (ELO) learning, an efficient meta-training algorithm that (1) reallocates wasted meta-training compute to longer failure regimes, achieving efficient long-horizon learning, and (2) enforces decoupled progressive expert supervision, providing stable meta-learning signals that additionally improve the generalization of LOs. Our empirical study evaluates ELO for meta-training both element-wise and matrix-based LOs. Across downstream language modeling (GPT-2-124M/350M on FineWeb) and image classification (ViT-B/16, ResNet-50 on ImageNet-1K) tasks, ELO substantially improves the long-unroll performance and out-of-distribution generalization of the base LOs. In particular, ELO-Celo2 consistently outperforms well-tuned AdamW across all evaluated tasks, while remaining competitive with Muon on language modeling. \textit{Notably, all ELO baselines require less than 7 H100 GPU-hours for meta-training.}
Xiaolong Huang, Benjamin Thérien, James Harrison et al.· 0 citations
Despite extensive safety alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreak attacks that bypass safeguards to elicit harmful content. While prior work attributes this vulnerability to safety training limitations, the internal mechanisms by which LLMs process adversarial prompts remain poorly understood. We present a mechanistic analysis of the jailbreaking behavior in a large-scale, safety-aligned LLM, focusing on LLaMA-2-7B-chat-hf. Leveraging edge attribution patching and subnetwork probing, we systematically identify computational circuits responsible for generating affirmative responses to jailbreak prompts. Ablating these circuits during the first token prediction can reduce attack success rates by up to 80\%, demonstrating its critical role in safety bypass. Our analysis uncovers key attention heads and MLP pathways that mediate adversarial prompt exploitation, revealing how important tokens propagate through these components to override safety constraints. These findings advance the understanding of adversarial vulnerabilities in aligned LLMs and pave the way for targeted, interpretable defense mechanisms based on mechanistic interpretability.
Paria Mehrbod, Boris Knyazev, Guy Wolf et al.· 0 citations