Diffusion large language models (dLLMs) have emerged as a promising alternative to autoregressive LLMs, offering efficient generation through block-wise progressive unmasking. However, their strong general-purpose performance does not necessarily translate into reliable mathematical reasoning, where correctness depends on preserving coherent numerical-symbolic reasoning trajectories. In this work, we analyze the decoding trajectories of LLaDA 2.0 and identify a recurring diffusion confidence trap: local token confidence can become misaligned with global reasoning correctness during progressive block decoding. Our analysis reveals two representative failure regimes: sampling-sensitive failures, where correct paths exist but are unstable, and sampling-consistent failures, where repeated sampling converges to repetitive high-confidence but incorrect continuations. Motivated by this observation, we propose Evolutionary Decoding, a training-free test-time scaling framework that views diffusion decoding as an evolutionary process over candidate reasoning states. The framework combines step-wise selection, which preserves useful numerical-symbolic signals and suppresses repetitive patterns, with block-wise mutation, which introduces structured alternatives to escape incorrect high-confidence basins. Experiments on multiple benchmarks show that Evolutionary Decoding improves LLaDA 2.0 over confidence-based decoding, leading to more reliable mathematical reasoning.
Zhenhong Sun, Hanqing Zhao, Yatao Bian et al.· 0 citations
LLM-based search agents are widely used for information-seeking tasks, but their reliance on external tool returns introduces a critical security risk: web content retrieved during execution is untrusted, exposing agents to prompt injection and goal hijacking. Prior work on search-agent safety primarily focuses on static web-content injection, but modern agents issue follow-up queries and cross-check competing sources, so a single injected page is often diluted or rejected. We show that the channel delivering search and page observations is a fragile security boundary: beyond exposing the agent to a single poisoned page, a mediated search interface can repeatedly steer how the agent gathers evidence and forms its final answer. Under a constrained tool-intermediary threat model, appending only one controlled result per query can substantially increase attack success when the evidence is coordinated across the agent's trajectory. We study this setting with a strategy-driven long-horizon attack system and introduce Authority-Chain Hijack (ACH), an expert-refined strategy that turns isolated search-result and page-content manipulations into a coherent evidence chain across seemingly corroborating sources. ACH achieves the highest Overall ASR among all baselines, reaching 55.9% / 83.3% ASR / MaxN ASR on the full SafeSearch test split. We further introduce Trace-Guided Strategy Evolution (TGSE), which automatically improves attacker strategies from execution traces, replacing manual redesign with trace-driven refinement; its strongest single setting reaches 71.4% / 95.0% in held-out evaluation.
Xuebin Li, Hanqing Zhao, Siyuan Liang et al.· 0 citations