Agentic AI is gaining acceptance in asset management, but governance has not kept pace: 88\% of surveyed finance professionals report no operational governance framework for agentic AI, and only 24 of 75 large U.S. money managers disclosing AI use in Form ADV filings report a formal governance policy. We argue this gap is architectural: governance built for static validation does not survive continuously retrained agentic policies. We propose a four-layer framework (Policy, Engineering, Composition, Systemic) grounded in two distinct kinds of evidence, kept explicitly separate: two calibrated synthetic illustrations (a regret-covariance drift monitor; a crowding simulation showing joint drawdown risk rising from 39.2\% to 79.3\%), and three real, documented cases (a deployed LLM-embedding trading strategy, a \$45 billion discretionary fund's forced-deleveraging blowup, and a tribunal ruling holding an airline liable for its chatbot). The synthetic examples demonstrate computability from observable data; the cases demonstrate that the failure modes are not hypothetical. We provide a 90-day implementation sequence spanning trading and payments/customer-facing systems.
We estimate Kyle's (1985) price-impact coefficient $\lambda$ directly from daily equity order flow and test its ability to forecast the cross-section of subsequent stock returns. Using CRSP data from 2020 to 2025, we construct firm-month measures of signed order flow and two estimators of $\hat\lambda_{it}$: a within-month price-impact regression and an Amihud-style ratio. Signed order flow strongly predicts contemporaneous and one-month-ahead returns, while volume volatility predicts lower subsequent returns, consistent with widening price impact degrading price discovery. Fama-MacBeth regressions confirm that our order-flow signal carries significant cross-sectional return information after Newey--West adjustment. Theoretically, we resolve the liquidity premium puzzle of Constantinides (1986) through an adverse-selection mechanism: low order flow widens $\lambda$ and depresses prices today; subsequent normalization restores prices, generating the illiquidity premium without risk-based compensation.