Hierarchical open-vocabulary object navigation (OVON) requires agents to follow free-form instructions that may specify targets through scene-, room-, region-, and instance-level cues in unseen environments. Although recent work LangMap has formalized this setting, reliably solving it under partial observations remains challenging: spatial grounding requires persistent environment-level evidence, whereas target verification requires clear and discriminative candidate views. We present SAP-Nav, a fully online, zero-shot framework that addresses both requirements through active perception. SAP-Nav incrementally constructs a Queryable Spatial-Semantic Representation from actively acquired room views, enabling spatial semantic queries from any explored location. It further employs Active Viewpoint Verification to assess whether the current observation provides sufficient evidence and, when necessary, reposition the agent to a more informative viewpoint before verifying candidates against category and attribute constraints. Although designed for hierarchical OVON, SAP-Nav supports both hierarchical and standard category-level OVON without task-specific training or precomputed scene maps. Experiments on LangMap and HM3D-OVON show that SAP-Nav achieves the overall best performance, including a 12.2% improvement in SR over training-based methods on region-level navigation. Real-world robot experiments further demonstrate its practical feasibility. Code will be made publicly available upon acceptance.
Xuetong Pei, Jian Liu, Vidura Munasinghe et al.· 0 citations
Self-supervised learning (SSL) encoders are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, posing threats to both visual SSL encoders and vision-language encoders. Existing defenses are typically designed for only one of these paradigms and rely on restrictive assumptions such as access to uninfected in-distribution data or precomputed pseudo-labels, which are difficult to satisfy in practice. To address these limitations, we propose DEFUSE, a generalizable backdoor detection framework for SSL encoders. Inspired by Bayesian posterior inference, we reformulate backdoor detection as a representation-conditioned image likelihood estimation problem parameterized by a conditional diffusion generative model. Uninfected representations tend to yield semantically consistent reconstructions, whereas backdoored ones are more likely to be mapped to the attacker's target class or semantically meaningless images, deviating from the original semantics and thereby exposing the backdoor. However, we find that the exact likelihood is intractable, because highly abstracted representations discard the low-level information necessary for pixel-faithful reconstruction. We therefore relax the objective to semantic reconstruction and evaluate it in a well-separated representation space provided by a reference encoder. Rather than training from scratch, we fine-tune a pretrained diffusion model, leveraging its generative prior to map data onto the natural image manifold while preserving semantic content. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DEFUSE substantially outperforms existing detectors across diverse attack settings, generalizing to both visual SSL and vision-language encoders. Notably, our method greatly reduces the reliance on prior knowledge about the victim encoder or the attack strategy. The source code is available at https://github.com/jsrdcht/DEFUSE .
Tuo Chen, Jie Gui, Minjing Dong et al.· 0 citations
A new attack-agnostic, model-agnostic, and modality-agnostic black-box test-time defense paradigm, inspired by the Platonic Representation Hypothesis, that can perform both representation detection and purification, and achieves substantial performance gains across multiple attacks.
Tuo Chen, Minjing Dong, Benlei Cui et al.· arXiv.org· 0 citations