Recent work has developed many techniques for formally verifying probabilistic programs. However, existing verification frameworks for probabilistic programs are restricted to idealized languages designed for verification. As a result, they cannot be used to verify off-the-shelf probabilistic programs written in standard languages. In contrast, for non-probabilistic programs, a number of verification tools now support verifying realistic code written in widely used languages such as Go, C, and Rust. To verify probabilistic programs written in these languages, it would be useful to be able to reuse, as much as possible, the extensive development work that has gone into such tools. This paper presents Alerus, a framework for verifying probabilistic Rust programs. Alerus is based on Verus, a verification tool for Rust that supports SMT-based automation and separation-logic-inspired reasoning features. Alerus extends Verus with support for probabilistic reasoning while retaining these expressive features. To do so, Alerus uses a lightweight encoding of probabilistic error credits, a form of ghost state for randomized reasoning introduced in the Eris program logic. By deriving an appropriate specification using error credits, Alerus supports verifying the correctness of randomized sampling algorithms. We use this technique to verify several sampling routines for discrete distributions, including samplers for the discrete Gaussian distributions, the alias method, and the fast loaded dice roller. We establish the soundness of our error credit extension by adapting VerusBelt, a recently developed logical relations model of Verus that encodes its features in terms of the Iris separation logic. To do so, we replace the use of Iris's standard weakest precondition in this model with Eris's probabilistic weakest precondition instead. The resulting soundness proof is fully mechanized in Rocq.
Large language models are increasingly used to find bugs in real-world programs, but they also produce a flood of false alarms that waste developers'time. We propose a method to prevent these false alarms by requiring an LLM to accompany each bug report with a machine-checked proof, in a program logic, that the reported bug is real. We follow the approach of incorrectness logics, whose under-approximate reasoning establishes that a claimed behavior is genuinely reachable, and hence a true positive. In our case, however, the logic must model a realistic programming language, have a mechanization so that proofs can be checked, and be complete, so that no real bug is ruled out for want of a derivation. We present Mizzle, an incorrectness separation logic for concurrent programs written in a substantial subset of OCaml, parametric in the notion of incorrectness. We mechanize Mizzle in the Rocq proof assistant on top of the Iris framework, and we prove that it is both sound (that is, it never justifies a false alarm) and complete (that is, every incorrect execution admits a derivation). We instantiate Mizzle with three notions of incorrectness: stuckness (triggering undefined behavior), the non-linearizability of a data structure, and the presence of a race. As a proof of concept, we illustrate how an LLM can use Mizzle in order to certify the existence of a bug.
Alexandre Moine, Sam Westrick, Joseph Tassarotti· 0 citations