Automatic uncomputation aims to provide programming-language-level support to facilitate the correct and safe use of ancilla qubits in quantum computing, but efforts have only been made for clean ancillas, leaving dirty ancillas unexplored. We present a unified formalization of the uncomputation of both clean and dirty ancillas. For the first time, we prove that checking the existence of uncomputation is coNP-hard. We introduce two complementary synthesis-oriented existence-checking methods: a rewrite-based normalization algorithm (RwUn) and a template-based reasoning system (TpUn) that guarantees uncomputation through structured Store-Use patterns. We implement prototypes of both methods in Qiskit and Python. Compared to the state-of-the-art Reqomp~\cite{reqomp}, RwUn achieves 100% coverage on practical complex-dependency benchmarks, twice the coverage on random classical circuits, and about 50% coverage on random quantum circuits beyond the scope of existing methods, demonstrating broader applicability.
Transport Layer Cryptography Protocol (TLCP) is a secure communication protocol developed in China, featuring a dual-certificate architecture and incorporating ShangMi cryptographic algorithms. It has been widely deployed in security-critical domains such as finance, government, and energy. Despite its practical significance, TLCP did not undergo comprehensive formal analysis during its standardization process, leaving potential design-level vulnerabilities insufficiently explored. Moreover, the advent of quantum computing poses fundamental challenges to the classical cryptographic primitives employed by TLCP, motivating the need for both systematic security evaluation and post-quantum enhancements. To address these gaps, we first construct the comprehensive formal model of TLCP, covering certificate-based and identity-based cipher suites as well as its distinctive dual-certificate mechanism, under a realistic threat model and security assumptions that capture both classical and quantum adversaries. Based on this model, we conduct an automated security analysis using ProVerif, identifying nine potential attack vectors and deriving five concrete mitigation recommendations. Finally, motivated by the analysis results and the limitations of incremental fixes against quantum threats, we propose KEMTLCP, a post-quantum secure variant of TLCP that leverages key encapsulation mechanisms (KEMs) for both key exchange and authentication while preserving TLCP’s architectural principles through a novel explicit authentication mechanism. We further provide a security proof for the core authentication mechanism, show that KEMTLCP effectively mitigates the majority of identified vulnerabilities through formal analysis, and evaluate its practical performance.
Hongbo Liu, Jingnan He, Jia-ao Ge et al.· Cybersecurity· 0 citations
