We study the truthful and fair allocation of indivisible goods to $n$ strategic agents with additive valuations. Babaioff, Feige, and Manaker Morag [FOCS 2026] gave a randomized mechanism that uses only the agents'rankings of the goods, is truthful in expectation (TIE), and guarantees every agent $1/(H_{n-1}+2)=\Theta(...
We study strategyproof mechanism design without transfers for the two-facility location problem in metric spaces. A mechanism selects two facility locations based on agents'reported locations; each agent incurs her distance to the nearer facility, and the objective is to minimize the expected social cost. A mechanism i...
Marginal-contribution pricing makes the social objective an exact potential, but does not ensure that every stable assignment is efficient. We study indivisible clients with heterogeneous workloads, arbitrary nonnegative assignment costs, and private eligibility menus over a fixed number of shared servers and optional...
Hao Li, Meng-Fan Ma· 0 citations
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