Coding agents (e.g., Cursor) improve developer productivity by optimizing task completion, but shifting users from writing code to prompting and reviewing may harm their understanding, impeding oversight, learning, and communication. To probe this, we have 54 students create a website with one of two AI systems: an agent that edits user code; or a chatbot where users write code alone or adapt generic code snippets. We test understanding via comprehension questions and a task where users extend their code without agents, showing: (1) While agents aid initial task completion, they harm users'code comprehension and thus do not prepare users to extend their code; (2) Low-effort agent interaction types, like copy+paste prompts and auto-accepted edits, are linked with lower comprehension; and (3) Despite self-reported weaker understanding, users still prefer coding agents because they are quick and easy to use. While users stay in the loop for coding workflows, understanding should not be forgotten. Towards this goal, we distill our analyses into future research directions for coding agent developers: dissuading low-effort prompting, creating readable code, and promoting active engagement.
Nishant Balepur, Connor Baumler, Valerie Chen et al.· 0 citations
Prior work has shown that LLMs encode the truth of factual propositions along linear directions in activation space. It's unclear how these representations extend to contextual truth: propositions whose truth is determined by in-context evidence rather than world knowledge. We show that LLMs maintain a linear representation of contextual truth that persists across structurally different output policies, even when the output doesn't require the model to determine a proposition's truth, and show causal evidence via steering experiments. Using the transcripts from a collaborative vision-language task that requires two LLMs to maintain a shared common ground, we show that truth representations of a proposition are significantly swayed by partner assertions about that proposition, even when the LLM has enough evidence to determine its truth. We find evidence that propositions near the decision boundary are more susceptible to having their truth shifted through partner assertions. Separating representation from output distinguish two forms of sycophancy that output behavior alone cannot: the model may accommodate a false proposition while continuing to represent it as false, or shift its representation across the boundary. The latter is 2.59x more common when the model agrees by restating the false claim explicitly than when it agrees implicitly.
