ABSTRACT This paper discusses three forms of structural injustice associated with disparities in the resources available to researchers, and the opportunity researchers have to pursue their scientific goals. These are: (1) resource injustice; (2) focus injustice; and (3) labour injustice. I argue that such structural injustice has significant epistemic implications, resulting in: shifts in research content; the exclusion of substantive portions of scientific community from contributing to knowledge production to the best of their abilities; the exclusion of specific methods and data sources from global scientific discourse, on grounds other than scientific quality and relevance; a loss of quality and reliability in processes and outcomes of inquiry; and the inability to implement openness and related forms of constructive scrutiny. To exemplify these forms of injustice and their epistemic implications, I discuss everyday challenges within life science sites in Italy, Ghana and Greece, as documented through ethnographic research. I conclude that structural injustice permeates the institutional and material conditions for the acquisition and evaluation of knowledge in many research locations around the globe, with damaging implications for epistemic practices; and that this prompts a reconceptualisation of what openness in research may mean and how this concept may be better implemented.
This special issue examines the promises and limitations of Open Science (OS) and the conditions that produce inequity, injustice, and exclusion in research. Going well beyond the free sharing of publications typically referred to as Open Access, OS aspires to take advantage of new communication technologies to enhance access to and use of all the components of research, ranging from data to models, software, techniques, instruments, protocols and review procedures (Boulton and Royal Society 2012). OS advocates argue that the competitive and proprietary regimes and metrics under which research is currently conducted damage the reliability, quality, and social relevance of science. The main reason is that these regimes and metrics erode opportunities for critical scrutiny and collaboration which are the hallmarks of scientific work. They also disincentivise the exchange of insights and methods within and across disciplines (Radder 2010) leading to an inward-looking academic culture more interested in competing for the next high-impact publication than in developing reliable long-term solutions to societal and environmental challenges (Edwards and Roy 2017).
Sabina Leonelli, Paola Castaño, R. Alcalay· Social Epistemology· 0 citations