Propositional Knowledge and Ineffable Understanding
This paper begins with the recognition of a class of extraordinary experiences I call ineffable understanding , whose contents are not linguistically expressible but whose phenomenal quality resembles that of ordinary states of understanding. I argue that understanding is a sui generis epistemic attitude not limited to propositional content: unlike knowledge, which is factive and propositional, understanding can involve non-propositional elements, and in its limiting case may be wholly non-propositional. The argument proceeds in three steps. First, building on Catherine Elgin’s argument for a non-factive interpretation of understanding, I show that understanding need not be factive. Second, I discuss three examples showing that understanding, in addition to propositional content, can involve a non-propositional element I call phenomenal engagement . Third, building on these two steps, I defend the thesis that ineffable understanding represents the limiting case of a continuous spectrum of understanding that begins with propositional understanding and gradually loosens its dependence on the constraint of factivity, propositional structure, and linguistic articulation.