DEFUSE: Generalizable Backdoor Defense for Self-Supervised Encoders with Generative Priors
Self-supervised learning (SSL) encoders are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, posing threats to both visual SSL encoders and vision-language encoders. Existing defenses are typically designed for only one of these paradigms and rely on restrictive assumptions such as access to uninfected in-distribution data or precomputed pseudo-labels, which are difficult to satisfy in practice. To address these limitations, we propose DEFUSE, a generalizable backdoor detection framework for SSL encoders. Inspired by Bayesian posterior inference, we reformulate backdoor detection as a representation-conditioned image likelihood estimation problem parameterized by a conditional diffusion generative model. Uninfected representations tend to yield semantically consistent reconstructions, whereas backdoored ones are more likely to be mapped to the attacker's target class or semantically meaningless images, deviating from the original semantics and thereby exposing the backdoor. However, we find that the exact likelihood is intractable, because highly abstracted representations discard the low-level information necessary for pixel-faithful reconstruction. We therefore relax the objective to semantic reconstruction and evaluate it in a well-separated representation space provided by a reference encoder. Rather than training from scratch, we fine-tune a pretrained diffusion model, leveraging its generative prior to map data onto the natural image manifold while preserving semantic content. Extensive experiments demonstrate that DEFUSE substantially outperforms existing detectors across diverse attack settings, generalizing to both visual SSL and vision-language encoders. Notably, our method greatly reduces the reliance on prior knowledge about the victim encoder or the attack strategy. The source code is available at https://github.com/jsrdcht/DEFUSE .