We revisit the problem of computing mean-field equilibria (MFEs) in discrete-time, monotone, finite-horizon mean-field games (MFGs). We show that, when the transition kernel is independent of the state-measure term and the reward function satisfies the usual weak monotonicity condition and is Lipschitz continuous, anchored proximal gradient descent methods can be used to compute a monotone MFE. We also establish last-iterate convergence results for these methods. Our approach relies on formulating the computation problem as an optimization problem over the space of occupation measures. Using this formulation, we show that the problem is equivalent to a class of constrained Lipschitz monotone inclusion problems. We then apply iterative methods for this monotone inclusion formulation to derive a tractable algorithm. The resulting algorithm achieves a convergence rate of \(O(1/\sqrt{T})\) after \(T\) iterations, without requiring any regularization. This rate holds even in the absence of a uniqueness assumption for the corresponding MFE.
We study contraction properties of non-stationary continuous-time mean-field games (MFGs) under discounting and entropy regularization. The state of the representative agent evolves according to a controlled continuous-time Markov chain, and both the state and action spaces are finite. In contrast to the undiscounted case, we show that, under a sufficiently large discount rate, finite-horizon MFGs admit a horizon-independent contraction condition, which also coincides with the corresponding infinite-horizon non-stationary contraction condition. As a byproduct, we obtain an explicit convergence rate between finite- and infinite-horizon mean-field equilibria. For each finite horizon, we further derive a refined contraction criterion from the spectral radius of a positive operator that majorizes the propagation of policy errors, and show that its large-horizon limit agrees with the horizon-independent contraction factor. Finally, we provide an explicit error bound between discounted and undiscounted finite-horizon regularized equilibria.