Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication requires continuous exchange of mobility data, but this information is highly sensitive and must be protected. Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) enables computation directly on encrypted data and has recently been explored for Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS), yet its practical feasibility for specific V2X tasks remains unclear. This paper experimentally evaluates three lattice-based schemes (BFV, BGV, CKKS) using OpenFHE on SUMO-generated mobility data. Three representative traffic-related tasks are considered: collision-risk detection, average speed estimation, and traffic density. For each scheme, we measure encryption time, homomorphic computation time, decryption time, ciphertext size, and correctness relative to plaintext baselines. The results show that all schemes achieve near-perfect correctness, and that aggregated analytics (average speed, density) complete well within non-safety-critical time budgets. However, all schemes consume a significant portion of the 100 ms safety message threshold. These findings quantify the current performance–privacy trade-offs of FHE in V2X scenarios and indicate that hardware acceleration or lighter cryptographic configurations are needed for real-time safety applications.
Louise Wegrelius, Theodor Johansson, Elias Gustafsson et al.· International Mediterranean...· 0 citations
Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication enables vehicles to exchange safety-critical messages, but its reliance on temporary pseudonymous identities makes it vulnerable to Sybil attacks, where a single attacker fabricates multiple identities to inject false information into the network. This paper presents a lightweight cryptographic mechanism that combines SHA-256 Proof-of-Work token mining with a time-windowed ratecontrol layer to limit the number of new identities a vehicle can activate within a given interval. The mechanism was implemented in Java and evaluated through a parametric simulation across three independent variables: PoW difficulty, rate limit, and attack intensity. Results show that a difficulty of 4 and a rate limit of 5 tokens per 10-second window provide an effective balance between Sybil resistance and legitimate vehicle access in an 8-vehicle scenario, with an average mining time of 0.227 seconds. The evaluation identifies the rate-control layer as the primary security mechanism, while PoW difficulty increases the computational cost per identity without independently capping accepted tokens. The proposed approach is infrastructure-free and suitable for regulated V2X deployments where attackers represent a minority of the network.
Maher Fayyad, Abdullah Awad, E. P. de Freitas et al.· International Conference on...· 0 citations
