External skills extend the capabilities of large language model agents, but also introduce an execution-time attack surface: a skill that appears benign under inspection may reveal harmful behavior only after particular environmental states, resources, or interaction histories are encountered. Existing scanners primarily rely on static analysis, predefined rules, or one-shot semantic judgments, making such conditional behavior difficult to elicit and attribute. We present SkillSentry, a dynamic safety-testing framework based on adaptive honey worlds. SkillSentry infers the intended capability boundary of a skill, constructs an LLM-simulated environment with controlled decoy resources, and adaptively generates tasks to explore its behavioral states. It then compares skill-enabled trajectories with matched no-skill executions, grounding suspicious behaviors in source code and verified execution traces before making a final decision. We evaluate SkillSentry against seven scanner configurations. SkillSentry achieves 99.50% Recall and 96.26% average F1 on standard benchmarks. Under semantics-preserving evasion, it reaches 92.95% average F1, compared with 80.07% for the strongest baselines. Our code is available at https://github.com/nizhangli062-jpg/SkillSentry-Adaptive-Honey-Worlds-for-Dynamic-Safety-Testing-of-Agent-Skills.
Nizhang Li, Zonghao Ying, Xiangfan Wu et al.· 0 citations
SafeFlow is proposed, a defense framework for multi-agent systems that formalizes malicious cross-agent propagation as a semantic information-flow problem and reduces attack success rates compared to undefended baselines and external defenses while retaining high benign task completion and a high paired safe--harm success rate.
Haowen Dai, Zonghao Ying, Wenfeng Li et al.· 0 citations