On-policy self-distillation aims to improve upon reinforcement learning from verifiable rewards (RLVR) by providing token-level scores derived from privileged information, such as reference solutions or critic feedback. These scores are treated as estimates of token-level action values, yet they answer a fundamentally different question: how the model's prediction changes when its input context is enriched, rather than how the expected outcome changes when a token is changed. We examine this gap along three dimensions: (i) whether the token-level score tracks task success; (ii) whether feedback generated from the same rollout causes the score to reflect agreement with its own description, and whether using feedback from other rollouts in the group mitigates this self-referential effect; and (iii) what behavior the resulting training objective actually reinforces. In experiments on AIME 2025, the implemented score distinguishes correct from incorrect rollouts at approximately chance level (AUC=0.505); using feedback from a different rollout does not consistently improve this discrimination; and all training configurations achieve only 24.2-33.9% Avg@4, compared with 64.2% for outcome-only GRPO. Moreover, the highest-entropy token decile accounts for 57-71% of the total absolute token-advantage mass, despite the score being least informative about reasoning quality in this regime. By contrast, similar experiments on SciKnowEval Biology improves held-out Avg@8 by 28.0%, while its corresponding trajectory scores achieve AUCs of 0.81-0.92. Together, these results suggest that dense credit assignment through distillation can be effective when its likelihood-based scores are empirically validated as meaningful proxies for outcome-relevant credit. When this alignment does not hold, however, the resulting supervision can fail to generalize and may substantially underperform outcome-based RL.
Xuan-Phi Nguyen, Shrey Pandit, Yiran Zhao et al.· 1 citation
World models enable a predictive substrate for planning and action, yet existing formulations merely answer a physical question: what/where it is, and how will it evolve. Human behavior, however, is driven by hidden mental state (what a person believes, wants, intends, feels, and considers socially permissible), so a model that tracks the physical scene but not what each agent knows and believes about it predicts the wrong action for the right-looking scene. We formulate Mental World Modeling (MWM), a generic theoretical framework that makes mental variables core components of a world model rather than posthoc rationales: MWM aintains a coupled physical-mental world state, renders a target-specific partial observation, and simulates how candidate actions jointly update both components. We instantiate the framework in MENTIS, a training-free and fully inspectable baseline that decomposes the process into state parsing, target-observation generation, action decomposition, coupled physical and mental transition, and branch-level value evaluation. On a manually constructed, quality-controlled dataset of situated decision scenarios spanning text, image, and sounding-video stories, experiments with 8 modern LLM-based world models demonstrate that explicitly modeling the mental state is essential for predicting human decisions. Deeper analyses further expose the bottlenecks of current mental world modeling. We expect MWM as a next stage of world modeling, from simulating physical scenes to simulating the minds that act in them.