LLM customization platforms allow users to build task-specific models for code intelligence tasks by embedding instructions into system prompts, without modifying the underlying model parameters. While these platforms lower the barrier to developing customized LLMs, they also introduce a new attack surface: instruction backdoor attacks, in which adversaries implant hidden malicious behaviors into customized instructions. However, existing attacks suffer from two key limitations. First, they often rely on explicit trigger patterns readily detected by platform-side or user-side inspection. Second, they require substantial manual effort to craft task-specific backdoored instructions, limiting their scalability. In this paper, we propose ARIA, an automated red-teaming framework for crafting covert and effective backdoored instructions against customized LLMs. ARIA leverages an attacker LLM to iteratively generate and refine backdoored instructions, guided by structured feedback from the target LLM along three dimensions: stealthiness, clean-task utility, and backdoor effectiveness. We evaluate ARIA on three code intelligence tasks, using four representative LLMs, and compare it with three baseline attacks. Experimental results show that ARIA achieves the highest attack success rate of 0.945, while maintaining the best clean-task utility across all tasks. ARIA also generalizes well across programming languages and remains robust to generation temperature. Furthermore, ARIA significantly outperforms existing attacks in evading platform-side and user-side detection, achieving a false negative rate of up to 1.000, and stays effective against existing defense methods, demonstrating its strong generalizability and robustness.
Yuchen Chen, Wei Cheng, Yuan Xiao et al.· 0 citations
The first systematic study of model editing as a model-level hardening mechanism for secure code generation is conducted, evaluating 3 state-of-the-art editing methods across diverse LLM families and comparing them with CoSec, a representative inference-time approach, focusing on security, robustness, generalization, and functional correctness.
Weifeng Sun, Quanjun Zhang, Yuchen Chen et al.· 0 citations
Large language models (LLMs) excel at general-purpose code generation, yet how well they handle scientific code remains an open question. Existing datasets and benchmarks are limited in scale, domain coverage, or executable verification, leaving the true gap between current LLMs and reliable scientific code generators inadequately assessed. To address these limitations, we present SciCodePile, the largest scientific code corpus to date, constructed from 37,737 public repositories and collectively comprising 128GB of code that spans multiple computational science disciplines. From this corpus, we further curate an executable benchmark of 200 tasks, each equipped with a sandboxed execution environment and an automated test harness for functional verification. We evaluate 15 LLMs from both open-source and closed-source families on three tasks: prefix-to-suffix completion, fill-in-the-middle infilling, and executable code generation. Results show that scientific code generation remains highly challenging: The best CodeBLEU reaches only 38.13 and 38.37 on the two completion tasks, while the strongest model achieves just 12.30\% Pass@1 on the executable benchmark, underscoring how far current models remain from reliable scientific code generation. To demonstrate the training utility of SciCodePile, we further show that continued pretraining on our corpus improves CodeBLEU by $\times$2.84 on scientific code completion, and instruction tuning on our data improves Pass@1 by $\times$4.79 on the executable benchmark. All code and data are available at https://huggingface.co/SciCodePile.
Weifeng Sun, Ye Fan, Yuchen Chen et al.· 0 citations