Contested Governance and Civilian Prosocial Behavior: Evidence from Lab-in-the-Field Experiments in India

Abstract

How does contested governance by states and competing armed actors affect the behavior of the governed? During civil conflicts, rebel organizations frequently provide public goods, judicial arbitration, and security, but these forms of governance often operate alongside local state institutions. Beyond avoiding violence, therefore, noncombatants must navigate the daily uncertainty of local governance by states and armed groups vying for territorial control. This, we argue, shapes their quotidian interactions with one another. Using a series of lab-in-the-field experiments and surveys from Naxal-affected Bihar, India, we find that individuals living under such contested governance exhibit greater interpersonal trust and trustworthiness and less opportunistic behavior. We propose two mechanisms to explain these patterns—fearing intra-community retaliation or substituting for the state with interpersonal reliance. Most evidence is only consistent with the latter. By connecting governance, rebellion, and social capital, this work makes important contributions toward understanding the micro-politics of local order during longstanding armed conflicts.