Aug 2026· International Journal of Law Management & Humanities· Vol 9, pp. 2629-2635· 0 citations
Abstract
Indian securities law does not recognise the dark pool as a category of trading venue: pre-trade transparency is mandated on every recognised exchange, and off-exchange crossing networks of the kind permitted under United States Regulation ATS or the European Union's MiFID II framework have no domestic equivalent. This article argues that the absence of a formal dark-pool category has obscured a functional equivalent that has grown inside India's own algorithmic trading ecosystem. Individual orders placed through broker-provided Application Programming Interfaces are visible on the exchange tape at the moment of execution, but the strategy that connects those orders across time, product segments and counter-parties is not disclosed to the regulator in real time. The result is a form of dark liquidity created not by a hidden venue but by an undisclosed pattern: information asymmetry that arises after the fact rather than before it. The interim order passed by the Securities and Exchange Board of India against Jane Street Group in July 2025 is used as a case study. SEBI's own account of that matter shows that the manipulative pattern it eventually found was reconstructed from two and a half years of trading logs across the cash, futures and options segments, and was not apparent from either the exchange tape or the disclosures available under SEBI's February 2025 circular on safer participation of retail investors in algorithmic trading. Using doctrinal analysis of the February 2025 circular, the exchange operational circulars issued under it, and the Jane Street interim order, the article contends that India's algo-trading framework regulates the messenger, namely the broker and the Application Programming Interface, but not the message, namely the cross-segment strategy itself. It draws a comparison with the volume-based transparency thresholds used for dark pools under MiFID II and argues for a strategy-level, cross-segment audit trail obligation, tied to the existing unique Algo ID architecture, as a proportionate means of closing the gap without displacing the principal-agent structure SEBI has already built.
This case is based primarily on secondary data sources, including regulatory orders and communications issued by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) and the National Stock Exchange (NSE), along with publicly available reports from financial news platforms such as Bloomberg, The Economic Times, Busines...
Crypto-listed equity perpetuals trade while the primary cash market is closed, yet still need a mark for margin, funding, and liquidation. We model the closed-window mark as the fixed point of an oracle operator with two blocks: external anchoring and self/peer derivative reference. From marks and proxies alone the two...
Dong-ju Seo, Doohwi Cha, Seung-Han Son et al.· 0 citations
Emerging economies have built the reporting architecture of climate policy far faster than they have built its price signal. Indonesia illustrates this pattern with unusual clarity: a sustainable finance taxonomy, a national carbon exchange operating since 2023, and a consultation on mandatory ISSB-aligned disclosure s...
Sahara Putri Dahlan· Journal of International Pol...· 0 citations
Developers of cutting-edge AI models are increasingly using trade secrecy to protect these models rather than patents; disclosure would reveal the configuration that gives the model its value, and thus secrecy also obstructs the algorithmic transparency that regulators, courts, and affected individuals now demand. This...
Ze-Yu Li· Scientific Journal of Econom...· 0 citations
Using regulatory interdealer trade‐level data on overnight indexed swaps (OIS) in India, the paper examines the trading behavior and prices in an interdealer market populated by traders of varying liquidity needs. Inactive investors receive a lower return relative to active investors when trading outside a central li...
Vidya Kamate, Abhishek Kumar· Journal of futures markets· 0 citations
Robert Shiller proposed perpetual futures in 1993 to create derivative markets for assets that are illiquid or whose price cannot be observed directly. Cryptocurrency markets later built the instrument under a different funding rule. We give a single no-arbitrage result that nests both designs: the perpetual price is t...
Aditya Gupta, Nicholas G. Polson· Entropy· 0 citations
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.