A latent dimension of Condorcet's jury theorem for multiple AI advisers
TL;DR
The way advisers split provides a common basis for predictive multiplicity, reconciliation load, and reliance miscalibration and separate aggregation from disclosure and turn the latter into testable questions about how disagreement should be presented and interpreted.
Abstract
When the same question is asked of multiple AI advisers, as in self-consistency and LLM-as-a-judge panels, Condorcet's jury theorem predicts that adding independent, competent advisers makes the majority more reliable. The theorem, however, has a latent dimension when viewed from the user's vantage: adding advisers also makes disagreement more visible. A binomial model reveals that this ``visible dissent''becomes nearly inevitable as the number of advisers grows, and that reliability and disagreement approach certainty at rates that cross at an adviser accuracy of 4/5 (0.8); below it, visible dissent eventually becomes more likely than a correct majority. Even ideal panels of independent and competent advisers can be correct in aggregate but appear divided; such disagreement does not by itself indicate aggregation failure. The way advisers split also provides a common basis for predictive multiplicity, reconciliation load, and reliance miscalibration. These results separate aggregation from disclosure and turn the latter into testable questions about how disagreement should be presented and interpreted.
