Institutional model for the governance of LEADER/CLLD in Bulgaria: A specialized executive agency as a solution to the structural contradiction between decentralization and centralism

Abstract

This paper analyzes the institutional constraints on the effective implementation of the LEADER/Community-Led Local Development (CLLD) approach in Bulgaria and proposes a concrete institutional model for overcoming them. The study proceeds from the premise that the approach holds substantial potential as a territorially oriented instrument for local development, but that its effectiveness is limited by a structural contradiction between the decentralized conceptual logic of LEADER/CLLD and the centralized institutional framework of its national implementation in Bulgaria. The analysis shows that the current distribution of functions between the Ministry of Agriculture and Food, as Managing Authority, and the State Fund “Agriculture” – Paying Agency creates a structural asymmetry, whose measurable consequences are systemic delays in contracting and disbursing project funds, limited procedural flexibility, and insufficient specialized administrative capacity. As an institutional response to these deficits, the paper proposes the creation of a specialized executive agency under the Rural Development Programme, with functions covering the administrative management of projects, methodological support for Local Action Groups (LAGs), monitoring and evaluation, and coordination of multi-fund financing. Two options for the institutional positioning of the agency are examined — as an independent structure under the Ministry, or as a specialized unit within the existing administration — and these are compared with established European practices (Austria, Germany, Ireland). The study concludes that overcoming the structural contradiction requires not a change in the conceptual philosophy of the approach, but a targeted institutional reconfiguration aimed at increasing the autonomy of Local Action Groups.