Jul 2026· Transportation Research Record· 0 citations· 39 references
Abstract
Ship traffic through the Turkish Straits occurs in a highly constrained navigational environment, where inaccurate prepassage reports can significantly increase the risk of maritime accidents. Vessels are required to submit Sailing Plan declarations (SP-1 and SP-2) before entry, but these reports often fail to reflect the actual technical and operational condition of the ships. Commercial pressure, time constraints, and intentional misreporting can create discrepancies between declared and actual readiness, raising the likelihood of collisions, groundings, or loss of maneuverability in congested waters. This study develops a reliability-centered framework to assess accident risks associated with reporting, contributing to the literature on human reliability and uncertainty management in maritime traffic. Risk criteria were identified by reviewing regulatory requirements, accident records, and relevant literature, and refined through expert input from Vessel Traffic Services (VTS), pilotage, Port State Control (PSC), and ship operations. The framework combines the Fine–Kinney method with an Intuitionistic Fuzzy TODIM (an acronym in Portuguese for interactive and multicriteria decision-making). The results indicate that undisclosed propulsion deficiencies, steering problems, and nontransparent withdrawal from passage queues are the most critical accident precursors. These findings highlight the importance of reliable reporting and provide practical and transferable guidance for reducing the risks of maritime accidents and improving risk management for vessel traffic. In particular, the results support the prioritization of propulsion and steering system checks, as well as the closer scrutiny of vessels withdrawing from passage queues, offering actionable insights for VTS operators, PSC authorities and marine pilots.
Maritime autonomous surface ships (MASSs) are reshaping the organization of navigation, ship operation, remote control and maritime supervision. However, the transition from crewed navigation to autonomy also changes the structure of safety risk. Traditional ship risk assessment approaches rely heavily on historical accident records and crew-centered operational assumptions, whereas MASS operations involve coupled risks arising from perception systems, autonomous decision-making, communication links, cybersecurity, remote control centers, environmental uncertainty and management readiness. To address the scarcity of operational accident data and the need for a structured safety evaluation method, this paper develops a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA)-based risk evaluation framework for MASS operations. A hierarchical indicator system is established from five dimensions: ship machinery, human factors, environmental factors, information technology and management. A frequency-severity risk criterion is then constructed by defining the Frequency Index (FI), Severity Index (SI) and Risk Index (RI), and by introducing the ALARP principle to classify unacceptable, tolerable and broadly acceptable risk regions. On this basis, an integrated fuzzy analytic hierarchy process is proposed to determine factor weights, transform expert judgements into membership degrees, and calculate comprehensive risk scores. A case study using 50 expert questionnaires shows that the overall risk score of MASS operation is 5.64, located in the ALARP region. Among the first-level indicators, environmental factors, information technology factors and ship machinery factors present relatively high risk levels, with scores of 6.82, 6.60 and 6.25, respectively. At the secondary-indicator level, intelligent navigation system, weather conditions, hydrometeorological conditions, communication capability, equipment and systems, navigation decision-making, and environmental perception are identified as high-intensity risk indicators. Further contribution decomposition reveals that environmental perception, routine ship management, navigation decision-making, and communication capability contribute most substantially to the overall risk profile due to their higher systemic importance. The proposed framework provides an interpretable approach for MASS safety assessment and risk-control prioritization under limited operational data availability.
This study analyzes the contribution of legal aspects and human factors to civil aviation accidents and incidents associated with Air Traffic Control (ATC) services. Utilizing a qualitative descriptive literature review methodology, this research conducts a comparative evaluation of the Halim Perdanakusuma runway collision accident (2016) and the Austin-Bergstrom near-miss incident (2023). The juridical framework is anchored in Indonesian Aviation Law No. 1 of 2009 and International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) standards, while systemic analysis applies the SHELL model and HFACS taxonomy. The results indicate that expectation bias and operational deviations from standardized radio-telephony phraseology are the primary drivers of cognitive and procedural failures. Weak supervisory monitoring and the absence of integrated surface surveillance technology further compromised the systemic defenses in both cases. In conclusion, runway accidents and incidents do not result from isolated operator errors but stem from interactive mismatches within the sociotechnical system. Enforcing legal compliance with standard safety procedures and accelerating the deployment of surface detection radar are critical mitigation strategies to prevent future occurrences.
Freshal Fitran, Elfi Amir, Rany Adiliawijaya et al.· International Journal of Hea...· 0 citations
Although navigational risk management has received considerable attention in maritime safety research, few studies have quantified collision and grounding risks in Indonesia’s narrow river fairways using long-term incident records. This study analyzed the risk levels of collision and grounding incidents involving KM. Tonasa Line XIX in the Mahakam River Fairway and evaluated compliance with Bridge Resource Management (BRM) practices in maintaining navigational safety. A descriptive qualitative approach was employed, drawing on BRM theory, Human Factors Theory, Situational Awareness Theory, the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972, and the International Safety Management Code. Data were collected through direct observation during sea practice, in-depth interviews with the Master and three Deck Officers, and a literature review. Risk quantification was conducted using the Formal Safety Assessment framework established in IMO MSC/Circ.1023 and based on 25 verified incidents recorded in the fairway between 2021 and 2026. The findings identified human error—including fatigue, miscommunication, and inappropriate decision-making—and environmental conditions, such as channel siltation, strong currents, and high traffic density, as the dominant risk drivers. Based on the formula Risk Score = Likelihood × Consequence, collision incidents, comprising at least 17 cases, and grounding incidents, comprising at least eight cases, each received a score of 9 and were classified as high risk. The study concludes that BRM procedures are available on board but are not consistently implemented, particularly in relation to situational awareness, assertive communication, and fatigue management. These findings extend the literature on incident-history-based Formal Safety Assessment in confined waterways and provide practical implications for shipping companies, bridge officers, and waterway authorities seeking to strengthen navigational safety in the Mahakam River corridor. The study also provides a basis for future comparative research involving multiple vessels and river fairways.
Yunus Hans Cristian Sihotang, Dion Lebang, Sunarlia Limbong· Journal multidisciplinary sc...· 0 citations
The regulatory disparity in nautical chart carriage requirements between SOLAS and non-SOLAS vessels poses a systemic risk for maritime safety. This study analyzes maritime traffic and grounding accidents in the East Adriatic Sea to examine the empirical patterns associated with this risk and to quantify this risk. Analysis of 2,699,930 vessel arrivals in Croatian ports (2012–2020) reveals that non-SOLAS vessels dominate traffic, outnumbering SOLAS vessels by factors of 3.44 (cargo) and 13.92 (passenger). Correspondingly, over 92% of 170 recorded groundings (2017–2019) and 90.6% of 202 groundings (2020–2025) involved non-SOLAS ships, predominantly during favourable weather conditions. The core problem is identified as the desynchronization in disseminating Maritime Safety Information (MSI) across official and unofficial chart systems, leading to inconsistent situational awareness. This risk is formalized through a conceptual objective function modelling the time delay in MSI updates across different chart production chains. These quantitative metrics demonstrate that the current regulatory gap exposes the majority of maritime users to a reduced safety standard, directly affecting risk management at the operational and regulatory levels. To minimize this delay and enhance navigational safety, the paper proposes a dual-pathway amendment: extending the ECDIS/ENC mandate to all SOLAS ships and establishing a new framework mandating the use of official ENC data within Electronic Chart Systems (ECS) for non-SOLAS vessels. This study is intended as a system-level analysis of regulatory and informational asymmetry rather than as a full accident-causation investigation. The findings should therefore be interpreted as exploratory and policy-relevant, with caution regarding direct causal inference for individual incidents. The proposed measures are essential to synchronize critical maritime safety information across all maritime users.
Jakša Mišković, Ivica Pavić, Mario Bakota et al.· Applied Sciences· 0 citations
Learning from casualty investigations is a requisite to effect maritime safety and marine environment protection. Moreover, it helps improve training. Communication at sea is a broad concept, as it includes exchanges within the ship's bridge, among crew members, as well as between crew members and pilots, together with ship-to-ship and ship-to-shore conversations. Communication takes place in various contexts, from routine ship operations, such as pilotage, to emergency situations, such as Search and Rescue (SAR). Communication is a human capability that entails both technical and non-technical skills. Technical skills can be evaluated, but non-technical skills are more challenging for appraisal. In addition, ships operate in a highly dynamic environment which makes information retrieval far more difficult than for an operator seated in an office ashore. How do casualty investigators break down miscommunication as a contributor to maritime accidents? What do they look for? Do they evaluate deviations? Is there consistency among investigation bodies in this regard? This study aims to better understand how casualty investigation agencies identify, label and frame failures in communication, and whether there is a common approach to communication across casualty investigation agencies.
Anne Bouyssou Chen· AHFE International· 0 citations
Flight safety is greatly influenced by the effectiveness of communication between pilots and Air Traffic Controllers (ATC). In many aircraft accidents and incidents, communication failures, readback/hearback errors, the use of non-standard phraseology, and limited situational awareness are significant contributing factors. This research aims to analyze the literature related to the relationship between pilot-ATC communication and aircraft accident and incident incidents, especially in the context of Air Traffic Services Safety Investigation. The method used was literature review with stages of identification, selection, analysis, and synthesis of literature from investigation reports, scientific articles, and international aviation safety documents. The results of the study show that unclear communication can trigger runway incursion, loss of separation, clearance errors, and delayed decision-making. Case studies such as the Tenerife Airport Disaster show that a combination of miscommunication, operational pressures, weather, and technological limitations can develop into fatal accidents. The conclusion of this study emphasizes the importance of standardization of phraseology, improving human factors training, implementing readback/hearback discipline, and strengthening safety support systems in ATS operations.