This work presents PAPC, a platform-mediated mechanism that intercepts information-moving events before they update shared state or external channels and positions event-level mediation as a platform-governance primitive for agent-mediated online work.
Abstract
AI-mediated platforms coordinate work through LLM agents acting for different principals. In these workflows, privacy loss can be created before a final answer appears: a memory write, shared-workspace update, inter-agent message, or tool event may impose downstream exposure cost on another principal. We model this failure mode as a privacy-propagation externality, where the cost of a raw disclosure depends on topology and fanout as well as content. We present PAPC, a platform-mediated mechanism that intercepts information-moving events before they update shared state or external channels. PAPC combines policy, provenance, topology/fanout, privilege, and content signals to allow an event, release a policy-safe abstraction, quarantine raw content, block a transition, or narrow onward rights. The model explains why final-output control misses intermediate exposure costs and why high-fanout objects amplify propagation. Across retrieval-memory and multi-agent workflow benchmarks, PAPC preserves deterministic task completion and eliminates measured exact raw-value and external raw-value exposure. The results position event-level mediation as a platform-governance primitive for agent-mediated online work.
MAP-Graph is introduced, a provenance-aware memory layer that represents agents, sources, memories, claims, and actions in a typed execution graph and supports provenance as an operational control signal, rather than only post-hoc audit metadata, within the evaluated setting.
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With $2.1 million funding from Google.org, the open-source Public Transit Intelligence Hub will unify public transit monitoring, operations, and passenger communication.