Aug 2026· ION GNSS+, The International Technical Meeting of the Satellite Division of The Institute of Navigation· 1 citation· 28 references
Engineering
Abstract
Intentional radio-frequency interference from low-cost GNSS jammers increasingly threatens the accuracy and reliability of satellite-based positioning. Mitigating this threat requires not only detection but also robust waveform classification and characterization, direction-of-arrival inference for localization, and impact estimation on receiver performance under realistic operating conditions; all of which are challenged by strong distribution shifts across devices, sensors, environments, and satellite geometries. We address these challenges by compiling a dedicated real-world dataset recorded during Jammertest 2025 (Andoya, Norway), covering two outdoor test areas with parallel measurements from a single-antenna E1/E5 receiver module and a 2x2 CRPA-array. The dataset spans diverse jamming, spoofing, and meaconing scenarios, including CW, PRN, sweep/chirp, and multi-emitter configurations, and is complemented by per-recording metadata enabling time-aligned ground truth. Methodologically, we benchmark 17 machine learning (ML) architectures for interference-modulation recognition and multi-task characterization (type, occupied bandwidth, and signal strength), and we quantify navigation-relevant degradation via a receiver-aware spectral separation coefficient (SSC) that maps measured spectra to effective (C_s/N_0)_{eff} loss. To enable multi-source analysis, we transfer a YOLOv8s and RF-DETR detector pretrained on a labeled spectrogram dataset to localize multiple simultaneous interferers in GNSS spectrograms and subsequently characterize each detected component. Results show near-99% within-area classification accuracy but substantial cross-area performance drops, highlighting the need for robustness to real-world domain shifts.
As an Internet of Things solution, backscatter communication (BSC) offers low cost and energy efficiency but suffers from high vulnerability to jamming due to its simple architecture and double-path fading. Existing methods rely on antenna arrays and beamforming to mitigate jamming but fail to provide localization, tra...
Jia-Wang Zeng, Deepak Mishra, Jin-Hong Yuan et al.· IEEE International Symposium...· 0 citations
Integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) has emerged as a key paradigm for unifying radar sensing and wireless communications within a shared hardware and spectral framework. In parallel, ambient backscatter communication (AmBC) has gained attention as a low-power solution for enabling passive connectivity by modula...
Awadhesh Gupta, Kumar Vijay Mishra, Naveen K. D. Venkategowda et al.· 0 citations
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are vulnerable to spoofing and meaconing attacks that threaten safety-critical applications including aviation, maritime navigation, and autonomous vehicles. Existing signal-level detection methods predominantly rely on labelled examples of real attack patterns for trai...
Muhammad Numaan, Zheng-Jia Xu· International Conference on...· 0 citations
We investigate the problem of data payload uncertainty (DPU) in bistatic integrated sensing and communication (ISAC) systems, which refers to imperfect knowledge of transmit data symbols at the sensing receiver. DPU may result from limited fronthaul capacity in base station (BS)-to-BS bistatic sensing or data demodulat...
Musa Furkan Keskin, Silvia Mura, Marouan Mizmizi et al.· 0 citations
In-Context Signal Completion (ICSC) is presented, demonstrating that small language models fine-tuned with Group Relative Policy Optimization and physics-informed rewards can reconstruct RSSI across sequential extrapolation and spatial interpolation tasks.
Autonomous vehicles increasingly rely on high-end multi-frequency GNSS receivers that track modernized civil signals, such as L2C, L5, and L1C, alongside legacy GPS L1~C/A. Although multi-frequency operation improves robustness against natural error sources, its resilience against synchronous multi-band spoofing attack...
M. Ahmad, Muhammad Sami Irfan, Sagar Dasgupta et al.· ION GNSS+, The International...· 0 citations
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