Many legal philosophers are sceptical about the justification for aggravating punishment based on motives. I argue that these sceptical positions may overlook an important dimension of moral and legal responsibility in that responsibility for motives does not hinge on "volitional control" — the agent's ability to manage their motives as they arise. Instead, it pertains to what is known as “the source control”, or the agent’s role in originating or endorsing their motives over time. From this standpoint, holding individuals responsible for motives involves considering whether they have, in some sense, endorsed or cultivated these motives as part of their identity, thus implicating them as genuine authors of their actions in a deeper sense. This distinction between volitional and source control may, therefore, offer a more nuanced approach to assessing the role of motives in criminal responsibility, particularly in cases like hate crimes where the motives are central to the offence.
Free will scepticism about moral responsibility denies that human agents possess the kind of control required for basic desert moral responsibility. This position is often taken to have substantive normative implications, including the rejection of retributive punishment and support for reformist approaches to crimin...
Thomas R. V. Nys, G. van Donselaar· Theoria· 0 citations
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim?
This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral...
A Kantian reconstruction of racialized moral psychology can illuminate the late Charles Mills’s account of white complicity. Unfortunately, philosophers have comparatively less to say about the incentive structure of the oppressed to participate in the systems that oppress them. Drawing on W. E. B. Du Bois’s notion o...
Elvira Basevich· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
It is widely acknowledged that appeals to tolerance are not as persuasive as they once were. Some argue that such calls simply reinforce the permissiveness that plagues our society. Others argue that tolerance does not go far enough and that positive recognition of differences should be our aim. To these, tolerance i...
Underlying the research for the purposes of this book were one basic assumption: transposing legal articles to behavioral norms, suitable in given circumstances and capable of resolving a problem, in this case from the realm of criminal law is difficult. This difficulty pertains not only to citizens, who cannot avail t...
Two very general ideas have shaped my thinking about constitutional law. The first is that most of the rights in the Charter protect or advance different aspects of our relationship or connection with others. We are social beings. Who we are – our identity, our agency – is shaped by our interactions with others. Rights...
Richard Moon· Windsor Yearbook of Access t...· 0 citations
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