The Dynamics of Asymmetric Decentralization in Indonesia: Autonomy or Dependence?
Abstract
The implementation of asymmetric decentralization in Indonesia presents a juridical-fiscal paradox, wherein the constitutional guarantee of broad autonomy frequently clashes with the high ratio of regional dependence on the central budget. This study aims to comparatively analyze the legal antinomy and governance of asymmetric decentralization in DKI Jakarta, the Special Region of Yogyakarta (DIY), Aceh, and Papua. Employing a socio-legal research method with statute and comparative approaches, this study examines the consistency of norms between the Law on Financial Relations between the Central Government and Local Governments (UU HKPD) and sectoral lex specialis regimes. The results indicate that broad legal autonomy does not correlate directly with fiscal sovereignty. DKI Jakarta has successfully converted its regulatory privileges into Local Own-Source Revenue (PAD) independence. Conversely, the block-grant legal design of special autonomy funds in Aceh and Papua triggers fiscal laziness due to the absence of performance-based normative obligations to optimize local potential, while DIY's fiscal capacity is constrained by rigid legal restrictions regarding the allocation of its Special Funds. This study recommends legal engineering through the harmonization of the UU HKPD with sectoral laws, as well as the transformation of funding transfer formulations into conditional performance-based grants, ensuring that asymmetric status serves as an instrument of equitable independence rather than perpetuating structural dependence.