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Domain-general computational integration in the Sense of Agency

Aug 2026 · bioRxiv · 0 citations · 38 references
Biology

TL;DR

Results provide direct evidence for domain-general integration between prediction errors in SoA, governed by a multiplicative computational logic.

Abstract

The Sense of Agency (SoA), the experience of being in control of one’s own actions, is thought to emerge from the comparison of internal sensorimotor predictions with afferent feedback. Classical comparator models treat SoA as arising from a prediction-feedback comparison. Volitional action likely engages multiple forward models that predict distinct features of an outcome, such as its timing and spatial trajectory. Whether prediction errors arising from these distinct forward models are integrated into a domain-general representation of agency, and if so by what computational logic, remains unresolved. We addressed this question using a Virtual Reality reaching task. Participants observed a virtual hand replicating their movements while we independently manipulated two sensorimotor domains: temporal delay and spatial angle deviation, in isolation and in factorial combinations. After each trial, participants made an SoA judgment. We examined whether SoA responses show computational hallmarks of integration between different features of sensorimotor prediction. Specifically, we pre-registered three computational models (Multiplicative, Minimum, and Mean) and compared their fit to per-trial responses. Across an exploratory sample (N = 16) and a pre-registered replication (N = 38), SoA declined monotonically with conflict magnitude in both domains. Critically, a Multiplicative integration rule consistently outperformed the Minimum and Mean rules. These results provide direct evidence for domain-general integration between prediction errors in SoA, governed by a multiplicative computational logic.

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