PROBLEMS OF COORDINATION BETWEEN THE GOALS OF MONETARY POLICY AND THE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Abstract

The article provides a comprehensive analysis of the degree of alignment between the goals of the Bank of Russia’s monetary policy and the strategic targets of socio‑economic development, based on verified data. It has been established that the goal of price stability (target 4 %) is in a state of systemic conflict with the objectives of growth and technological sovereignty. It has been shown that the mega‑regulator, guided by the recommendations of international financial organizations and following the globalist mainstream, is effectively simulating a fight against inflation, driving the economy into an “inflation trap,” where a high key interest rate does not suppress prices but drives them up through the cost channel and blocks the transformation of savings into investment. The dependence of Russia’s monetary policy on the monetary policy of the US Federal Reserve has been identified, depriving the country of sovereignty in managing the economic cycle. Empirically, it has been demonstrated that the economy has entered a stagflation zone for the first time since the second quarter of 2022. Inflation expectations are de‑anchored, while the inflation observed by the population is higher than the official figure, and the core public narrative is the image of a “factory country,” which fundamentally contradicts the current high‑rate policy. Using leading indicators, it has been shown that the risk of a systemic banking crisis is considered to have materialized, and the probability of a recession is high. Commercial banks have ceased to perform the function of transforming savings into investments, having turned into debt restructuring committees. A critical analysis of alternative proposals (institutional, monetary, fiscal) shows that they are insufficient without restoring monetary sovereignty and abandoning external dependence. Recommendations are provided regarding debt targets, “protection” of the development budget, rejection of the autonomy of the mega‑regulator, implementation of a two‑circuit monetary system with targeted loans at 0.2–3 % for the real sector, and modification of monetary policy in line with the “not at any cost” principle.