The traditional distinction between content and function words continues to underpin much psycholinguistic research, even though other areas of linguistics have long recognized it as problematic (e.g. Bennis et al., 1983, and Ishkhanyan et al., 2017 within aphasiology; Diessel, 1999: 150–153, and Bisang, 2010: 291 within linguistic typology; Emonds, 1985: 162–164, and Rauh, 1993 within grammatical theory). We argue that relying on this pre-theoretical distinction in psycholinguistics can obscure meaningful variation and potentially lead to misleading results. We illustrate this with Staub (2024), who, in a large-scale eye-tracking study, found no evidence that so-called function words are skipped more often or receive shorter fixations than so-called content words. We argue that this null finding likely stems from Staub’s function word group being heterogeneous, containing both lexical and grammatical items. In support of this, we reclassify the words in Staub’s function word group as either lexical or grammatical based on a usage-based theory of the lexical-grammatical contrast (Boye & Harder, 2012), and rerun the analysis in his Experiment 1 on this group of words. Our analysis suggests that the grammatical words receive shorter fixations than the lexical words, providing support for the heterogeneity of the function word group. Given this, it is unsurprising that Staub found no differences in reading measures between the function and content word categories. This case demonstrates how relying on the traditional function-content distinction in psycholinguistic research can obscure meaningful patterns, and it highlights the potential of adopting Boye and Harder’s (2012) usage-based alternative.
Bilingualism research sits at the intersection of linguistics, cognitive neuroscience, and psychology, yet these
disciplines often operate in relative isolation, limiting explanatory power and theoretical progress. This paper argues that
deeper, more purposeful cross-fertilization among these fields is both possibl...
Jason Rothman, David Miller, V. DeLuca et al.· Linguistic Approaches to Bil...· 0 citations
Recent psycholinguistic research shows strong evidence that sometimes sentences are comprehended via good-enough processing (for example, based on semantic heuristics) rather than algorithmic syntactic analysis. However, little is known about individual differences in reliance on good-enough processing versus precise a...
Angelina Shapovalova, S. Malyutina· Quarterly Journal of Experim...· 0 citations
Theories of the mental lexicon must explain how people use context to interpret ambiguous words (e.g., "internal organ" vs. "musical organ") and why people vary on this core aspect of comprehension. Theoretical development has been hampered by the lack of reliable tests of disambiguation skill. We introduce a task in w...
L. M. Blott, A. Gowenlock, A. J. Parker et al.· Quarterly Journal of Experim...· 0 citations
The nature of the mental lexicon remains one of the central controversies in cognitive science, bearing on
fundamental questions concerning the representation and processing of linguistic knowledge. In this article, we examine Gary
Libben’s contributions to the study of lexical representation and processing, with p...
R. D. de Almeida, Lori Buchanan· The Mental Lexicon· 0 citations
This study investigates how the concept of morphological transcendence (
Libben, 2010
,
2014
) is manifest across semantic, visual, and phonetic
processing of English compounds. The theory of morphological transcendence proposes that constituents inside compounds take on
position-specific meanings that differ...
M. Bell, R. Baayen· The Mental Lexicon· 1 citation
In language, not only do sentence meanings depend on how words are structured together, but word meanings also depend on their roles in the structure. While we have some understanding of how the brain grasps complex meanings built from simpler parts, we know far less about how linguistic structure reshapes the meanings...
Simone M. Krogh, L. Pylkkänen· bioRxiv· 0 citations
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