We often accuse others, and sometimes ourselves, of engaging in, as psychologists are apt to term it, “motivated reasoning.” This is the charge that the collection, use, and interpretation of information have been warped by one'sdesires, andis often regarded as amounting to a charge of epistemic irrationality. In a 2015 paper in this journal, we appealed to this familiar charge of motivated reasoning to analyze the phenomenon of irrelevant influences on belief. There, we argued that motivated reasoning is indeed epistemically pernicious. Since then, a number of important objections have been made in different literatures. It has been argued that insofar as one's interests include defending one's prior beliefs, remaining internally coherent, defending one's social identity against threats from oppressive forces, or pursuing one's (otherwise reasonable) practical goals, such interests may permissibly influence reasoning, with no irrationality or “bad” reasoning implicated. In this paper, we address these recent objections and argue that, though the above points may illuminate important limitations of our original thesis, motivated reasoning is indeed a form of epistemic irrationality.
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim?
This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral...
This book is a sustained attack on the claim that values are objective, in the world independent of people’s attitudes. It evaluates this claim in different value domains: moral, personal or prudential, aesthetic, and general evaluative. The first section greatly expands on J.L. Mackie’s appeal to moral disagreement...
A significant proportion of human reasoning is systematically biased, a fact that sits uneasily with argumentation theory’s methodological commitment to the principle of charity. Traditionally, the principle requires arguments to be reconstructed as plausibly and rationally as possible, which conflicts with the defin...
Nastasia Mueller, David Löwenstein, G. Vosgerau· Argumentation: an internatio...· 0 citations
People are often offended by beliefs, expect apologies for beliefs, and apologize for their own beliefs. In many mundane cases, people are morally criticized for their beliefs. Intuitively, then, beliefs seem to sometimes wrong people. Recently, the philosophical literature has picked up on this theme, and has starte...
D. Enoch, Levi Spectre· Philosophical Perspectives· 12 citations
The capacity for reasonable argument about practical and political matters is important to our daily lives. Yet what does arguing really involve? Often, our very concept of what it is to argue seems systematically distorted. Practical, political arguing is too often stylized as hyper-cognitive, ending by treating peopl...
Blake Roeber’s
Political Humility
is a wonderful piece of work; it’s clear and accessible enough that I’d expect a general educated audience with no philosophical background to profitably read all but the last two chapters (which get more into the epistemological weeds than the earlier parts of the book), while sti...
Daniel Greco· Canadian Journal of Philosop...· 0 citations
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