SRAM based Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) rely on configuration bitstreams stored externally that need to be reloaded every time the device is powered up. Consequently, FPGAs are always exposed to the risk of intellectual property piracy, hardware trojan’s introduction and configuration manipulation. Once Xilin...
Madhumitha V, Nithin Raj T, S. P· International Conference Inn...· 0 citations
Integrated circuit (IC) camouflaging is an effective approach to protect semiconductor intellectual property (IP) from reverse engineering attacks. Traditional IC camouflaging methods typically rely on specialized cells capable of performing various functions based on manufacturing or configuration. However, some of th...
Jian-Wen Zhou, Hao-Ting Shen, Kui Ren· International Test Conferenc...· 0 citations
The results indicate that the proposed integration enhances SAT attack resistance while maintaining acceptable hardware overhead, making it suitable for secure IoT hardware deployments.
P. M, S. P· International Journal of Inf...· 0 citations
This work focuses on detecting (low-level) vulnerabilities in masked FPGA designs through experimental and tool-assisted evaluation and shows how to formally abstract, unveil, and mitigate such leakages, thereby enabling a security-aware FPGA design flow that spans from the behavioral to the physical level.
Nicolai Müller, Daniel Lammers, Simon Osterheider et al.· IACR Transactions on Cryptog...· 0 citations
It is shown that RTL Trojans exhibit stable structural and signal-flow patterns post-synthesis, enabling effective detection through targeted heuristics rather than generic ML feature learning.
Navid Nader Tehrani, Azadeh Davoodi, R. Topaloglu· arXiv.org· 0 citations
This work focuses on detecting (low-level) vulnerabilities in masked FPGA designs through experimental and tool-assisted evaluation and shows how to formally abstract, unveil, and mitigate such leakages, thereby enabling a security-aware FPGA design flow that spans from the behavioral to the physical level.
Nicolai Müller, Daniel Lammers, Simon Osterheider et al.· IACR Cryptology ePrint Archi...· 0 citations
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