An offline model-based RL framework for cost-controllable sequential incentive allocation is developed and an independent counterfactual scorer evaluates each learned policy on held-out logs, enabling pre-launch selection without costly online exposure.
Abstract
Complete your ad view and grab a 5-cent bonus! In incentivized advertising, a platform promises users a bonus before observing downstream ad revenue, encouraging them to click and complete ads. It must balance the incentive promised in advance against the revenue realized afterward: insufficient incentives forfeit monetization opportunities, whereas excessive incentives reduce net profit. Because current incentives may also shape user expectations and future engagement, incentive allocation is a sequential decision problem with delayed revenue, cost sensitivity, and carryover effects. Existing work has not studied decision-making algorithms for this setting. Auto-bidding assumes available ad opportunities, while targeted promotion optimizes incentives outside the ad monetization pipeline. We formulate the problem as an MDP and develop an offline model-based RL framework for cost-controllable sequential incentive allocation. It learns a world model of user feedback and ad revenue, then performs conservative policy optimization. An independent counterfactual scorer evaluates each learned policy on held-out logs, enabling pre-launch selection without costly online exposure. Experiments on large-scale industrial data and online A/B tests show that the scorer provides a stable offline signal. The deployment path from causal inference to offline RL and then Offline-MBRL further validates the framework: MB-IQL improves per-user net profit by 7.96\% over TD3+BC, whereas reverting to plain IQL reduces it by 6.56\% (both \(p<0.0001\)).
Incentivized advertising allocates monetary or virtual rewards to drive user engagement, where a key challenge is optimizing continuous incentive magnitudes under strict global constraints. This problem is complicated by high-frequency interactions, delayed feedback, and non-Markovian user dynamics such as fatigue, whi...
Gege Chen, Ning Luo, Hao Jiang et al.· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
Incentivizing Effort While Learning the Market Condition
When a firm hires an agent to generate customers in a new market, neither party initially knows whether the market is favorable. In “Dynamic Contract Design with Learning,” Wang, Liang, and Sun study the interaction between learning and moral hazard: effort is c...
This work proposes a Causal auto-Bidding method based on a Diffusion completer-aligner framework, termed CBD, which achieves superior performance on large-scale auto-bidding benchmarks, but also delivers significant improvements on an online advertising platform, including a 2.0% increase in target cost.
Ye-Wen Li, Jingtong Gao, Peng Jiang et al.· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
Dynamic pricing in ride-sharing platforms must balance revenue generation with stable pricing decisions under changing demand and supply. This study aims to develop and evaluate a reinforcement learning-based dynamic pricing policy that maximizes expected revenue while reducing abrupt policy-level price adjustments. A...
Nur Alamsyah, Budiman, Almira Nurchawilah et al.· JITK (Jurnal Ilmu Pengetahua...· 0 citations
GRB (Generative Reinforcement Bidding) is introduced, a large-scale generative bidding framework with an Offline-to-On-Policy (O2P) training paradigm that consistently outperforms strong online and offline baselines and incorporates an adaptive constrained exploration module to mitigate reward hacking.
Hongchang Wu, Weitong Ou, Heng-Quan Guo et al.· Proceedings of the 32nd ACM...· 0 citations
Machine-learning networks can learn without detailed instructions from a designer. Those that do may offer insight into how the brain reorganizes itself during learning.
We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads.
See our Cookie Policy.