Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies are vulnerable to localized physical perturbations, yet existing certified patch defenses target discrete labels and cannot directly certify continuous, temporally correlated actions. We introduce CertVLA, a certified defense for closed-loop VLA control under bounded patch and texture attacks. CertVLA proposes a calibrated region of behaviorally consistent actions, while deterministic covering masks ensure that at least one checked prediction is attack-free. Specifically, CertVLA normalizes action disagreement by the benign variation of each mask pair and accepts a single-mask anchor only when it remains consistent under every second mask. It then calibrates the resulting max-min-max episode score to provide finite-sample clean coverage. Conjoining query-level decisions extends the action certificate to the complete closed-loop rollout. Furthermore, we prove that against any adaptive attacker satisfying the bounded-support threat model, every rollout certified by CertVLA executes only action chunks consistent with attack-erased clean predictions. Under dual-mask rollout correctness, this consistency certificate further guarantees task success. The certificate is independent of patch content, generation method, and physical transformation. Experiments in simulation and the real world demonstrate the empirical and certified effectiveness of CertVLA against patch attacks, with additional simulation validation on texture attacks.
A novel sparse adversarial patch attack algorithm (Sparse Patch Attack, SPA), which successfully misleads the text generation results of VLMs by generating highly dispersed discrete pixel perturbations in non-salient regions of the image.
T.-Y. Chen, X.-Y. Hu, J.-F. Wang et al.· Advanced Electromagnetics· 0 citations
It is concluded that while visual perturbations act as a viable near-term stopgap, long-term assessment security requires educators to reapproach assessment design given continually increasing VLM performance.
Christopher Burger, Christina Trotter, Joseph D. Carlisle et al.· 0 citations
Adversarial patches to Vision-Language-Action (VLA) policies can cause both immediate action corruption and persistent state effects that remain after the patch is removed. Existing evaluations largely focus on continuous attacks and do not separate these two effects. We introduce a state-restoration protocol that remo...
Enjia Wu, Fu-Sen Guo, Yu-Xin Cao et al.· 0 citations
DefTEval is introduced, a controlled evaluation framework that systematically assesses whether input-level adversarial defenses, which operate on the pixel content of already-sampled frames, can mitigate observation-level attacks and demonstrates that securing VideoLLMs requires system-level robustness mechanisms spann...
Bang-Shuo Zhu, Wei Song, Yu-Xin Cao et al.· 0 citations
Adversarial patches can disrupt Vision-Language-Action (VLA) models by manipulating visual observations, leading to failures in robot control. However, it remains poorly understood which internal mechanisms underlie these failures and how targeted interventions can mitigate them. In this work, we mechanistically analyz...
Yukiya Horiba, Koshiro Aoki, Shunsuke Yasuki et al.· 0 citations
Foundation models increasingly operate across modalities (vision, language, audio, and vision–language)
and are deployed in decision-critical pipelines with tool use and retrieval. This expands the adversarial surface: small perturbations to images or audio can flip predictions, carefully crafted text can induce unsafe...
Vishwanath· International Journal For Mu...· 0 citations
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