Skip to content

AgentXploit: Autonomous Repository-to-Runtime Red-Teaming for AI Agents

Sep 2026 · arXiv.org · Vol abs/2609.31318 · 1 citation · 49 references
Computer Science

TL;DR

This work presents AgentXploit, a two-role auditing system that separates repository-level attack-path discovery from runtime exploitation and introduces AgentXploit-Bench, containing 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open-source AI-agent systems and frameworks.

Abstract

AI agents combine language models with external data and tools that can modify files, call APIs, or execute code. Security failures can arise when adversarial content changes an agent's tool use or when the surrounding software contains vulnerabilities such as path traversal or command injection. We study authorized white-box pre-deployment auditing, where the auditor has access to the target repository and a controlled runtime, but successful attacks must still act through the task-defined attacker interface and be confirmed by an external verifier. We present AgentXploit, a two-role auditing system that separates repository-level attack-path discovery from runtime exploitation. The Analyzer Agent traces attacker-controlled inputs to sensitive operations and records code-supported candidate attack paths; the Exploiter Agent turns these paths into concrete attacks and revises them using runtime feedback. We also introduce AgentXploit-Bench, containing 72 reproducible vulnerabilities across 12 open-source AI-agent systems and frameworks. Across three runs, AgentXploit reaches 59.3% end-to-end success, compared with 38.4% for Codex. Under a token-budget-matched comparison, Codex reaches 46.3%. On AgentDojo, where injection points are provided, the Exploiter Agent reaches 79.2% attack success versus 52.7% for AgentVigil. These results highlight repository discovery and runtime exploitation as distinct challenges in end-to-end agent security auditing.

View source

Similar papers

Review Open access Sep 2026

Policy-Constrained Runtime Defense for Tool-Using AI Agents in Enterprise API Ecosystems

A policy-constrained runtime enforcement framework that intercepts each proposed action before execution and classifies it as allow, deny, or escalate is presented, providing a structured basis for controlled evaluation of policy-constrained runtime enforcement across tool-using enterprise agents.

Swapneswar Ray · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

REDAgentBench: Executable Red Teaming and Faithful Measurement of LLM Agent Systems

RedAgentBench is introduced, an executable framework for autonomous red-teaming and faithful measurement that shows that executable evaluation can improve safety measurement and identify actionable intervention points.

Zixing Chen, Xingyuan Liu, Jie Zhu et al. · 3 citations
Sep 2026

MetaPermit: Scalable and Auditable Access Control for AI Agents via LLM-Inferred Meta-Attributes

The results show that MetaPermit produces 31% more consistent authorization decisions than LLM-driven authorization and outperforms the state-of-the-art defenses CaMeL and IPIGuard in both task completion and robustness to IPI attacks, with no malicious tool calls executed.

Han-Zhang Ma, Ali Hariri, Tian-Xiang Shen et al. · 1 citation
#artificial intelligence Preprint Sep 2026

SEAD: A State-Based Perspective on Attack and Defense in Tool-Using Agents

This work forms attack and defense as partially observed state control in SEAD, deriving their design requirements from this shared execution process and constructs an environment-verifiable dataset integrating controlled initial states, replayable tool environments, and task-specific executable checks.

Xin-Jie Shen, Jun-Ran Wang, Rong-Zhe Wei et al. · 0 citations
Preprint Aug 2026

SynChain: Inducing Computer-Use Agent Systems to Construct Their Own Attack Chains

This work introduces SynChain, a self-synthesized attack paradigm utilizing persistence-aware directed supervised fine-tuning to induce agents to create poisoned yet benign-looking artifacts, proving that securing CUAs requires provenance-aware reasoning over cross-task execution trajectories.

Fu-Yao Zhang, Jia-Ming Zhang, Che Wang et al. · 0 citations
#artificial intelligence Preprint Aug 2026

AgentKernel: The Trust-Native Agentic Operating System

This work argues that agents need an operating-system substrate providing mandatory, non-bypassable services for identity, input mediation, memory governance, and execution control, and introduces AgentKernel, a trust-native agent operating system built around the premise that security must be a first-class design cons...

Zhen-Hua Zou, Sheng Guo, Qiu-Yang Zhan et al. · 0 citations

Related blog posts

We use cookies to run the site and, with your consent, for analytics and to show ads. See our Cookie Policy.