Endogenous Information in Routing Games: Memory-Constrained Equilibria, Recall Braess Paradoxes, and Memory Design

Abstract

We study routing games in which travelers optimize over routes that are remembered or surfaced, rather than over a fixed exogenous action set. The paper develops a tractable design theory for endogenous recall and then connects it back to an explicit finite-memory micro model. At the micro level, each traveler carries a finite memory state, receives surfaced alternatives, chooses via a logit rule, and updates memory under a policy such as LRU. This yields a stationary Forgetful Wardrop Equilibrium (FWE); existence is proved under mild regularity, and uniqueness follows in a contraction regime for the reduced fixed-point map. The paper's main design layer is a stationary salience model that summarizes persistent memory and interface effects as route-specific weights. Salience-weighted stochastic user equilibrium is the unique minimizer of a strictly convex potential, which yields a clean optimization and implementability theory. In this layer we characterize governed implementability under ratio budgets and affine tying constraints, and derive constructive algorithms on parallel and series-parallel networks. The bridge between layers is exact for last-choice memory (B=1): the micro model is then equivalent to the salience model, so any interior salience vector can be realized by an appropriate surfacing policy. For larger memories, we develop an explicit LRU-to-TTL-to-salience approximation pipeline and add contraction-based bounds that translate surrogate-map error into fixed-point and welfare error. Finally, we define a Recall Braess Paradox, in which improving recall increases equilibrium delay without changing physical capacity, and show that it can arise on every two-terminal network with at least two distinct s-t paths. Targeted experiments support the approximation regime, governed-design predictions, and the computational advantages of the reduced layer.