The results support a narrow conclusion: the verifier changes what the system ships, while deterministic code supplies enforcement and auditability; they do not establish superiority to other agents or generalization beyond lab targets.
Abstract
We evaluate whether a verifier-and-acceptance stage - a model verifier whose verdicts are enforced by deterministic code - changes what an LLM-driven offensive-security agent reports. We report a 15-run exploratory pilot, a pre-registered 20-run confirmatory ablation, and a pre-registered 2 x 2 factorial study with 40 runs across two deliberately vulnerable lab targets. In the confirmatory study, removing the stage eliminated pre-report suppression (median 2 versus 0 findings per run; exact one-sided p = 0.00003) and reduced model-blinded shipped precision (median 0.471 versus 0.353; p = 0.0087). Recall against a frozen but incomplete ground-truth list did not differ significantly (two-sided p = 0.158; equivalence was not established). The factorial study attributed suppression to the model verifier (Holm-adjusted p = 0.004); deterministic acceptance rules alone suppressed no false positives, and no interaction was detected (p = 0.72). The full design retained 93.8% of model-adjudicated true candidates but did not meet its pre-registered non-inferiority criterion because the lower one-sided 95% bound was 0.875, below the 0.90 floor. Across the confirmatory and factorial studies, an instrumented canary recorded zero contacts in 60 of 60 runs, with incidental external contacts disclosed separately. Independent human adjudication of the retained blind packets is pending, so precision and sensitivity endpoints are supporting rather than final evidence. Six audit-trail failures, including one in the evaluation tooling, are also disclosed. The results support a narrow conclusion: the verifier changes what the system ships, while deterministic code supplies enforcement and auditability; they do not establish superiority to other agents or generalization beyond lab targets.
The protocol---pre-registered post-conditions, R0/R1 repair ladder, G1--G3 semantic evidence levels, and patched-counterfactual oracles---is a reusable template for the security reproducibility community.
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