Vartiainen Implementation with farsighted agents

Logrolling affects the relative performance of majority and unanimity rule

We consider a committee facing binary decisions on a number of proposals. If members vote sincerely and payoffs are symmetrically distributed, we show analytically that simple majority rule is the best q-majority rule in an aggregate or expected payoff sense. We argue that this (well known) pattern changes systematic...

Behavioral Forces Driving Information Unraveling

Contracting for LLM Delegation: Moral Hazard in Technology and Effort Choice

We extend the standard Principal-Agent framework to scenarios where the Agent selects from a suite of technologies, each characterized by a distinct cost-capability profile. This framework is increasingly critical in the era of Large Language Models (LLMs), where Agents choose both a model and an associated effort leve...

Games and Economic Behavior

DE TRAVAIL - WORKING PAPERS

CAVEAT: Towards Robust Computer-Use Agents in Incentive-Misaligned Environments

CAVEAT-Harness is developed, which targets failures and raises the optimal purchase rate by up to 80.0 percentage points, and targeted post-training further improves a smaller open model, to establish incentive robustness as a distinct challenge for delegated agents and diagnose failure modes.