Symbolic Protocol Verification modulo XOR in ProVerif

LLM-Assisted Automatic Security Proofs for Cryptographic Protocols: How Far Are We?

Large language models (LLMs) have shown strong potential for assisting software and security analysis tasks, yet their effectiveness in cryptographic symbolic protocol verification remains insufficiently understood. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic evaluation of the capability of state-of-the-art LLMs in...

Scaling Verification of Cryptographic Software with Aeneas, Rust, and Lean

This work develops a new methodology for verifying cryptographic software and extends SymCrypt with experimental optimizations and implementations of algorithms such as FrodoKEM, ML-DSA, and HPKE to explore the scalability of writing, adapting, and verifying cryptographic code.

CMoSS: Composable Modular Security Specifications Framework

ZSafe: Proving the Safety of Proprietary Hardware Designs in Zero Knowledge

Protecting the confidentiality of hardware designs is essential, especially during third-party verification, where proprietary designs must be examined by potentially untrusted verifiers. Existing approaches, such as obfuscation, watermarking, design encryption, and prior privacy-preserving verification techniques, are...

Verification of Protocol Compliance by Symbolic Execution

This paper proposes symbolic execution as an efficient approach to bounded verification of communication-protocol compliance in embedded firmware. Such protocols are often validated empirically, but conventional test cases may fail to expose subtle instances of noncompliance. We present an approach that applies symboli...

Scaling Zero Knowledge UNSAT Verification via Normalized Chaining

Proofs of UNSAT are a standard primitive in formal verification and software assurance. In many real-world settings, the proof itself encodes proprietary or security-sensitive information, making public disclosure undesirable. Zero-knowledge certification of UNSAT addresses this tension: it enables a prover to convince...