A novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable.
Abstract
We introduce a novel Divide and Conquer control design methodology leveraging differential games in single-agent, multi-objective dynamical systems. The proposed framework associates each control objective with a virtual input and establishes a non-cooperative, finite or infinite horizon differential game among representative players. Each player optimizes a distinct virtual cost function tailored to its specific goal, the full system state, and the other virtual inputs, while accounting for the remaining players'optimal policies. By establishing a Nash Equilibrium for this game, we synthesize a composite controller that achieves a stable balance across competing objectives, providing control engineers with an intuitive and modular framework for parameter re-tuning throughout the design cycle. We provide formal mathematical derivations for both continuous-time and discrete-time dynamical systems, targeting large-scale single-agent applications where complex, dynamically conflicting control objectives make global weighting intractable. To demonstrate the methodology, we developed an open-source Python package implementing a novel numerical algorithm for solving Coupled Algebraic Riccati Equations arising in infinite-horizon differential games. We evaluate the approach on two benchmark case studies: an inverted pendulum on a cart and a non-linear hierarchically controlled quadrotor. The resulting closed-loop performance is compared against the classical Linear Quadratic Regulator (LQR) across various transient and steady-state control metrics, demonstrating superior trajectory tracking and robust multi-objective regulation.
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