Sep 2026· International Journal for the Study of Skepticism· 1 citation· 3 references
Abstract
This paper clarifies the methodology of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024). The book aims to dispose of external world skepticism without building or appealing to epistemological theory. John Greco urges this can’t be done. In response, this paper clarifies what is meant by “epistemological theorizing” in this context. I then address Greco’s argument that no refutation of skepticism can be satisfactory as a refutation unless it involves epistemological theory. I show how an approach like mine, which works from within the commitments, practices, and procedures of ordinary epistemic life, can explain why the skeptic is wrong and yield deeper understanding of the contours of ordinary epistemic life as well as of what knowledge and reasonable belief require. Three moments from my book illustrate how my methodology yields refutation, explanation, and understanding—without engaging in the form of theorizing that Greco demands.
Crispin Wright urges that there is a compelling skeptical argument that the method of my book,
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(OUP, 2024), cannot satisfactorily address. This charge is incorrect, as this paper explains: materials already in the book provide a satisfactory response. The paper clarifies my approa...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 0 citations
When, if ever, is it permissible to afford special consideration to friends and family? How can we strive to be objective in our thinking, and is this always a feasible or appropriate aim?
This book examines the categories of impartiality and objectivity by showing how they frame certain debates in epistemology, moral...
The book lays the groundwork for a novel account of rule-following which is both philosophically substantive and partially reductive. The account the book proposes is philosophically substantive in contrast with the kind of discourses that exemplify a quietist approach to philosophy. It is partially reductive inasmuc...
This paper provides a brief overview of the chapters and main themes of
How to Take Skepticism Seriously
(Oxford University Press, 2024). It sketches the book’s approach to its primary aim: showing how external world skepticism can be satisfactorily refuted without building or depending upon epistemological theor...
Adam Leite· International Journal for th...· 0 citations
This article aims to reconceptualize the legitimacy crisis of algorithmic governance as a problem of epistemic boundaries rather than technical design. Debates on algorithmic justice have largely revolved around transparency, explainability, and user trust, while a more basic question has remained in the background: on...
Harun Serpil· The Turkish Online Journal o...· 0 citations
The article examines various interpretations in 18th-century philosophy of Locke’s supposition that matter could think. According to Locke, since there is no contradiction between the ideas of matter and thought, we cannot, by our own faculties and without revelation, know whether the Creator has endowed certain system...
Maksim D. Evstigneev· Voprosy filosofii· 0 citations
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