Regulating Dynamic Contracts ∗

WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMICS & ECONOMETRICS Franchise Contracts with Ex Post Limited Liability

The effects of minimum wage regulation in inter‐regional oligopoly competition

We examine how minimum wage regulation affects firm profit when labor‐market power interacts with product‐market competition. A binding wage floor reduces the regulated firm's marginal labor cost, inducing it to expand production. This expansion can induce rivals to contract production when relevant strategic variabl...

Schedule equilibria

This paper studies general equilibrium when households and firms choose price-contingent schedules and market clearing determines prices. A unilateral schedule change therefore changes both an agent's realized allocation and the price at which it is evaluated. We call the resulting outcome a schedule equilibrium. The c...

Optimal Paternalistic Regulation of Markets

Many markets are regulated for paternalistic reasons. We develop a mechanism-design framework to derive the optimal policy mix between price regulation and quantity controls. A budget-constrained planner allocates trade between privately informed buyers and sellers while disagreeing with their valuations. When the plan...

in a Decentralized

Working Paper Series 2014-04 Optimal incentive contracts to avert firm relocation