Agent benchmarks should report success together with whether the evaluated information state supported it, and whether the evaluated information state supported it should report success together with whether the evaluated information state supported it.
Abstract
A correct answer can conceal why an agent succeeded. Once agents change their information state during evaluation, correctness no longer distinguishes intended reasoning from answer acquisition. Outcome evidence and exposure detection do not establish whether success depended on an acquired target; we call this missing evaluation object success provenance. AcquaBench audits it through matched CLEAN, GOLD, and SHAM value substitution on four standardized surfaces with joint qid-clustered analysis. CLEAN retains benchmark-authorized information. GOLD makes the correct target available. SHAM preserves source structure and exposure opportunity but substitutes a matched incorrect value. GOLD minus CLEAN measures the total score response to correct-target availability; GOLD minus SHAM tests whether that response tracks target correctness beyond matched source exposure. In D0, GOLD exceeds SHAM by 19.1 to 25.9 percentage points, showing that success follows the correct value. In D2, GOLD still exceeds SHAM under distributed sufficiency while coloc no longer transfers as a high-score marker, with AUROC 0.376 and 0.142. Behavioral dependence can thus persist beyond this probe's intended observation unit. In model comparison, a supported 5.0-point CLEAN score gap compresses to a raw GOLD difference of -0.6 points without establishing rank inversion. Agent benchmarks should report success together with whether the evaluated information state supported it.
A target-specific authorization audit is introduced that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target and holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority.
Results show that additional capabilities introduce trade-offs among detection, repair, evidence grounding, conservative behaviour, reproducibility, and operational cost rather than producing consistent improvements in reference-free agentic data cleaning.
Evaluators often produce correct labels via flawed reasoning, a critical failure for agentic systems gating actions, routing reviews, or supplying training feedback. Standard evaluation only verifies final label correctness, ignoring whether judgment changes stem from valid evidence, consistent rules, or proper rule applicability. We formalize evaluator reasoning accountability via three core sources: grounds, norms, and authority. Varying these sources yields an eight-cell counterfactual judgment cube to characterize judgment updates. We define judgment receipts as minimal source replacement sets that reproduce revised verdicts to explain judgment transitions. We derive certification cost bounds for black-box evaluators and present ReasonBench, a policy and logical reasoning benchmark with verifiable receipts covering 19,520 cases and 7,200 controls. In frozen evaluations, Qwen3-1.7B reaches 98.41% receipt accuracy, while cube prediction scores 96.99%, a consistent 1.42-point drop validated by Qwen3-0.6B replication. Strong standard accuracy masks severe robustness flaws. Meaning-preserving source permutations reduce valid receipt recovery to 54.8% and 49.2% for direct and cube prediction. Models trained on simple single-source changes retain 93.75% verdict accuracy but recover only 7.16% of receipts for complex multi-source updates. Permutation retraining boosts consistency to 96.6% yet worsens cube prediction deficits. Structured counterfactual supervision fails to guarantee robust reasoning. We show reason-aware evaluation must decouple prediction and certification, reporting transformation consistency alongside standard accuracy for trustworthy evaluator auditing.
Security evaluations of tool-using agents often equate stored labels with behavioral facts. We audit a preserved campaign by tracing 10,200 execution rows to 180 model-bound requests, 45 semantic requests, and 15 observable stimuli. Two schema treatments were delivered, but the planned external payload-family corpus was not. The historical grader exhibited direct treatment leakage: treatment metadata gated the ATTACK_SUCCESS class, so fixed behavior could change class under treatment relabeling. A treatment-blind reconstruction corrects 58 historical ATTACK_SUCCESS or HIJACK_ATTEMPT labels to authorized benign completions while preserving three verified protected-data transfers and one separate unauthorized-forwarding case. The locked v2 census contains exactly zero ATTACK_SUCCESS records, while the forwarding case remains a HIJACK_ATTEMPT at a semantic boundary concerning objective completion. A dual-reviewer blinded concordance review of all 96 requests deemed structurally interpretable by locked v2 produced identical reviewer-consensus classes but differed from the locked codebook on four construct-boundary cases. We contribute a seven-link Integrity Chain and an executable, scope-bounded endpoint-integrity linter. The result is a campaign-bounded measurement audit, not a population attack-rate, model-ranking, defense-efficacy, or causal estimate.
Agent benchmarks increasingly evaluate repository editing, web research, terminal use, and long-horizon interaction. Their scores support capability claims only when the evaluation protocol keeps the intended capability necessary for success. Recent reward-hacking benchmarks and system reports show that agents can instead recover public solutions, read evaluation artifacts, infer generator structure, manipulate feedback, or benefit from invalid scoring paths; existing responses do not provide a common procedure for attributing these shortcuts and quantifying their effect across benchmarks. We formulate protocol validity and introduce HackDetect, a post-hoc audit that identifies an exposure, determines how the agent used it, and assesses whether the resulting score is misleading. We quantify score inflation with the Mislead gap, defined as the exploit score minus the intended score. We audit 2,385 traces across 15 agent benchmarks and find evidence of exposures and reward hacking in 67.0% of Frontier Science traces and 66.7% of AutoLab tasks. Across paired comparisons, we measure score inflation of 0.45-1.00, showing that benchmark reports should provide evidence that scores reflect the intended capability.
Jiaqi Shao, Hanck Chen, Wei Zhang et al.· 3 citations
A pipeline promoting an AI system publishes records claiming the thing evaluated is the thing deployed and that the evidence licensed the transition, and measures whether those records can express that claim and whether it holds where declared.