This paper uncovers a severe vulnerability in Robot Operating System (ROS) 2: by modifying a single environment variable, an adversary can execute a pre-built hook to covertly intercept and inject both telemetry and control signals before they are published.
Abstract
In multi-robot collaboration, task handovers rely on downstream verifiers performing remote attestation, which inspects sensor telemetry to ensure a robot's physical behavior strictly matches its assigned task. But can this telemetry be trusted? We show that it often cannot. In this paper, we uncover a severe vulnerability in Robot Operating System (ROS) 2: by modifying a single environment variable, an adversary can execute a pre-built hook to covertly intercept and inject both telemetry and control signals before they are published. Consequently, adversaries can hijack a robot to perform dangerous tasks while spoofing downstream verifiers with synthesized fake telemetry. Worse still, by exploiting the widespread reliance on third-party Docker containers and auxiliary tools, attackers can distribute compromised packages embedded with these malicious hooks to launch such attacks easily. On a physical Franka Emika robotic arm running Secure ROS 2, our attack injects fabricated telemetry in real time with only around 3 ms of jitter, preserving temporal synchronization and hardware integrity while achieving an 87% success rate even against an AI-based detector. We have responsibly disclosed these findings to the ROS 2 development team. We prepared a demo video available at https://youtu.be/ExeiGqUrnhQ.
Autonomous unmanned vehicles are vital to tactical missions, mission-critical public-safety operations like search and rescue and disaster response. However, their reliance on open wireless links and standard Robot Operating System (ROS 2) middleware exposes a broad cyber-physical attack surface. A compromise of these...
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