A decision-contract theory showing error is only reassigned among harmful automation, human deferral, and semantic masking, and an error-conservation law showing error is only reassigned among harmful automation, human deferral, and semantic masking is developed.
Abstract
An unconditional risk bound on automated decisions can be satisfied without automating anything, since a selector that never acts drives the bound to zero. We show this is structural: any risk certificate is defined over a decision contract, the inputs a system acts on plus the semantic relation under which an output counts correct, and weakening either hides base-classifier error. We develop a decision-contract theory: an error-conservation law showing error is only reassigned among harmful automation, human deferral, and semantic masking; a label-free singleton capacity certifying structural incapacity, with a risk-feasible refinement separating recoverable threshold misalignment from risk-constrained incapacity; and a non-degenerate actionability certificate excluding all-abstain solutions by construction. We instantiate this on ATT\&CK-aligned alert triage for LLM-based intrusion detection, the setting that exposed the vacuity failure. Across 3 IDS datasets, 6 LLMs, and 4 error-rate thresholds, empirical false-attribution risk stays at or below target in 90.3% of configurations, with 83.4% mean correct automation. The capacity diagnostic explains every low-utility configuration; its refinement separates genuine misalignment from risk-constrained incapacity, confirmed by an exhibited alternative threshold; a training-stability re-run finds no confirmed structural-incapacity instance; and real fine-grained attack-subtype labels confirm the coarsening-transfer identity under a genuine many-to-one map, with small but non-zero masking mass.
Freshness-constrained audit capacity (FCAC) is developed, a decision-support framework that treats automation as an authorization decision constrained by action risk, evidence freshness, and shared review capacity.
Real-time N-1 contingency screening in an energy management system trades assurance against cost: verifying every credible outage with full power flow is too slow, while fast linear-sensitivity screening gives no statistical guarantee and can silently pass unsafe operating points, especially when a controller drives the system into unfamiliar regimes. This paper introduces Audited Selective Verification, a risk-budgeted screening and triage layer for any controller's output (optimization, model-predictive, or learned). A cheap surrogate proposes which outages to skip; an online audit runs full power flow on a small random sample each window; and a calibrated threshold certifies a thermal-violation-rate bound for the skipped set at a chosen budget and confidence, with a corresponding bound for the unverified trusted subset. Validity rests on real verification and the audit rather than on surrogate accuracy, so it holds under arbitrary deployment shift. It is a risk-budgeted screen, not a replacement for deterministic verification when policy requires checking every credible contingency. On three public transmission systems up to 1354 buses, the realized violation rate stays within budget, standard deterministic and calibrated screens become unsafe under shift, and the method cuts full power-flow studies by 29 to 75 percent per real-time operating point.
A Supervisory Explainable AI (XAI) Toolkit is proposed, a privacy-preserving auditing platform inspired by the BIS Innovation Hub's Project Noor that equips regulators to independently probe and assess proprietary AI models without requiring firms to surrender raw data, model weights, or trade secrets.
Andrew Moore, Samuel Allen· World Journal of Advanced Re...· 0 citations
Agents that act on a compressed representation of their history face a structural risk: if the representation aliases histories with different optimal actions, no rule measurable with respect to the representation can avoid an irreducible per-round loss, and the agent may be unable to detect this from its own transcript. This paper develops a four-layer theory of self-certification of representation adequacy. The static layer defines decision-theoretic adequacy through a Bayes-risk grouping identity and prices a one-shot external verification by an exact total-variation threshold. The sequential layer poses certification as an optimal-stopping problem in the currency of task loss: we define an environment-wise certification complexity constant through a covering linear program, prove an information-task-loss lower bound for every delta-correct strategy, and give a Certification Track-and-Stop policy whose cost matches the bound asymptotically. A final boundary layer gives an explicit kernel-switching example and identifies the open theorem needed to cover policy switching or representation repair; it does not claim that the fixed-kernel guarantees extend to representation revision. The proofs of the two main theorems are given in full in the appendices.
High-impact generative AI makes catastrophic misuse a lifecycle-control problem, not merely a prompt-filtering problem. SAGE is a safety-first, authorization-separated architecture in which credible catastrophic-enablement risk constrains admissibility before utility, latency, or commercial objectives are considered. It combines signed release manifests, diverse detectors, robust risk envelopes, least-risk defaults, output checking, three-valued monitoring, protected audit chains, containment, and rollback. Formal results establish safety priority, conservative detector bounds, monotone release gating, tamper-evident records, and an authorization cut; two PRISM abstractions verify authorization separation and lifecycle invariants under explicit assumptions. A frozen, vendor-symmetric study sent 84 cases to each of four GPT, four Claude, and two Gemini snapshots: 840 calls yielded 794 target responses, 46 provider errors, and 449 successful judgments covering 375 responses. Eight snapshots had complete judged domain coverage. Harmful-compliance estimates were low; variation arose mainly from benign utility and safe redirection. Seven multiplicity-adjusted contrasts involving Claude, Gemini, or GPT-5 snapshots and the GPT-5 mini and GPT-5 nano snapshots were supported, while no tested contrast between the Claude or Gemini snapshots and GPT-5 or GPT-5.5 survived correction. The observed harmful-compliance range is a conservative, protocol-bound view from one generation per prompt with no tools, retrieval, history, or human adjudication; it is not an upper bound on operational assistance. A preregistered extension specifies how to test a wider best-worst gap using a locked split, repeated sampling, multi-turn and sandboxed-tool conditions, and domain-expert scoring.
Deploying ML models in regulated decision-making (credit underwriting, fraud detection, loan approval) requires demonstrating fairness and robustness to auditors without exposing model weights or customer data. We address this attestation problem for U.S. bank supervision under SR 11-7 and OCC 2011-12 guidance. We present a chunked zero-knowledge circuit design that attests an aggregated fairness statistic - the demographic-parity gap - on committed, nonce-sampled batches of real 2022 HMDA mortgage data, and demonstrate it end-to-end: 32,768 rows, 32 independently verified zkSNARK proofs, aggregated attested gap within 0.0029 of the true held-out value, per-chunk proving under 4 seconds. We also demonstrate extensibility by attesting a second control on the identical architecture - expected calibration error at 10 bins - with all 32 chunks verified, per-chunk proving at about 14.7 seconds, and attested ECE within 0.00037 of the plaintext value on the same committed rows. We compare this design against two alternatives - a flat summation circuit, which overflows past a few thousand rows, and a tree-reduction circuit, numerically exact but intractable to compile - and find the chunked design is the only one that reached this scale. We discovered and root-caused a genuine data-quality failure (a sentinel-code outlier distorting circuit proving and the fairness statistic itself) and resolved it with a published preprocessing specification. We also propose a fuller mapping from SR 11-7 and OCC 2011-12 control language to zero-knowledge statements (nine control elements spanning soundness, calibration, robustness, and drift), a nonce-based sampling protocol resisting bank-side cherry-picking, and a threat model for deployment, proposed as design work, not implemented results. Two controls, one model class, one task are demonstrated end-to-end; the rest is scoped and left as future work.
Mohammad Nasir Uddin, Rahnuma Tabassum Orpita, Eklachur Rahman Bhuiyan et al.· 0 citations